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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on firm financing and how issues related to
firm financing may impact on the macroeconomy.
In the second chapter, the role of collateral in debt contracts is explored within
an environment where banks also face regulatory solvency constraints. I model a
credit market with imperfect information and aggregate uncertainty. Here collateral
plays a dual role. First, it can help mitigate the adverse selection problem by acting
as a screening device. Second it also helps the bank satisfy any regulatory constraint
by reducing the loss given default that the bank suffers in bad aggregate states. As
the regulatory constraint becomes more strict, collateral may become less effective
as a screening device, highlighted by the possibility of pooling equilibria existing.
The third chapter builds a model of SME loan applications that is consistent
with existing survey data. Specifically, it captures several observable features of
the loan market. By explicitly modelling the loan application phase, I am able to
justify why firms apply for loans and are still subsequently rejected. This chapter
also provides a theoretical contribution in that there is the possibility, in a model
without asymmetric information, of ’pure credit rationing’ where observationally
equivalent firms are granted a loan with while others are not.
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The fourth chapter, investigates how creditor and debtor rights in the case of
firm insolvency impact on the equilibrium outcomes in a firm dynamics model. Two
insolvency regimes are compared, a creditor-friendly regime such as the UK and a
debtor-friendly regime such as the US. Debtor-friendly regimes are shown to be
more costly in the steady-state, leading to larger spreads on firm debt. The model
dynamics find a response to productivity shocks that are largely consistent with the
UK and the US following the financial crisis.
Impact Statement
A key topic for policy makers, especially since the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008,
is firm financing; questions include whether firms have sufficient access to finance,
what determines how and to what extent firms are financed and what happens if
firms cannot repay their debt. These questions are of interest to policy makers in
and of themselves but of greater importance is the link between firm financing and
the performance of the economy as a whole. This thesis address some key issues of
firm financing that are of particular importance to policy makers and contributes to
the academic debate in these areas.
Chapter 2, titled Banking regulation and collateral screening in a model of in-
formation asymmetry, explores the role of collateral in debt contracts within an en-
vironment where banks also face regulatory solvency constraints. This is especially
relevant for policy makers as following the Financial Crisis, there has been an in-
creased focus on bank regulation. In particular, stress-tests such as the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and the subsequent Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (CCAR) in the US and similar programs in other countries,
have been found to negatively impact lending to firms by Acharya et al. (2018) and
others. Chapter 2 complements this literature through a theoretical adverse selec-
Impact Statement 6
tion model that proves the existence of pooling equilibria should banking regulation
become sufficiently strict.
Chapter 3, titled A Model of Credit Rationing in SME Loan Applications, ad-
dresses the determinants of a firm’s access to finance. Existing models are inconsis-
tent with survey data that distinguishes between applications for bank loans and the
outcome of those loan applications. In the data, we observe firms that choose not to
apply for loans because they think they will be rejected, while other firms apply, but
are still rejected outright. By explicitly modelling the loan application phase and
the loan decision phase, I am able to capture the key features of the data.
Chapter 4, titled Macroeconomic implications of insolvency regimes, addresses
the question of what happens when a firm defaults on its loan obligations and to
what extent this matters. Specifically, I investigate how creditor and debtor rights
in the case of firm insolvency impact on the equilibrium outcomes. In particular,
in an application to the financial crisis, I show that labour productivity falls more
sharply in the creditor-friendly regime while employment does not. In addition, this
chapter suggests a possible explanation for the different employment and labour
productivity response in the UK and US since the financial crisis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What determines whether firms get sufficient financing and how does the availabil-
ity of financing impact firm decision making? Since the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, these questions have become increasingly important to the understanding of
the economy. This thesis consists of three chapters on firm financing and how issues
related to firm financing may impact on the macroeconomy.
In Chapter 2, titled Banking regulation and collateral screening in a model of
information asymmetry, the role of collateral in debt contracts is explored within
an environment where banks also face regulatory solvency constraints. Recently,
regulators and policy makers have increased their focus on ensuring stability in
the banking sector. Stress-tests such as the US Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP), are one tool which regulators can use to ensure bank solvency. I
model a credit market with imperfect information and aggregate uncertainty. Here
collateral plays a dual role. First, it can help mitigate the adverse selection problem
by acting as a screening device. Second it also helps the bank satisfy any regulatory
constraint by reducing the loss given default that the bank suffers in bad states of the
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world. As the regulatory constraint becomes more strict, collateral may become less
effective as a screening device, highlighted by the possibility of pooling equilibria
existing.
Chapter 3, titled A Model of Credit Rationing in SME Loan Applications, is
concerned with building a modelling framework for the study of SME loan appli-
cations that is consistent with existing survey data. Specifically, it aims to capture
several observable features of the loan market. First, firms choose whether they
apply for a loan, and firms that do not apply for loans may not need a loan, or may
think they will not obtain a loan. Second, a firm’s loan application may not be suc-
cessful. A firm may receive only part of the funding it had requested, or it may have
its loan application outright. By explicitly modelling the loan application phase, I
am able to justify why firms apply for loans and are still subsequently rejected. This
chapter also provides a theoretical contribution in that there is the possibility, in a
model without asymmetric information, of ’pure credit rationing’ where observa-
tionally equivalent firms are granted a loan with while others are not. This result is
made possible because of the additional loan application phase.
Chapter 4, titled Macroeconomic implications of insolvency regimes, inves-
tigates how creditor and debtor rights in the case of firm insolvency impact on the
equilibrium outcomes in a firm dynamics model. I build a heterogeneous firm model
with financial frictions where defaulting firms can enter insolvency and continue
production or be liquidated and exit. Financial frictions impact firm production
decisions and make capital relatively more costly than labour for borrowing con-
strained firms. As a result, financially constrained firms are less capital intensive
17
and have a lower capital-to-labour ratio than unconstrained firms. Two insolvency
regimes are compared, a creditor-friendly regime such as the UK and a debtor-
friendly regime such as the US. Debtor-friendly regimes are shown to be more
costly in the steady-state, leading to larger spreads on firm debt. The model dy-
namics find a response to productivity shocks that are largely consistent with the
UK and the US following the financial crisis. I show that the model provides a
precise account for the differential effects of productivity shocks across economies
that differ in the credit/debtor rights. In particular, in an application to the finan-
cial crisis, I show that labour productivity falls more sharply in the creditor-friendly
regime while employment does not. This paper suggests a possible explanation for
the different employment and labour productivity response in the UK and US since
the financial crisis.
Chapter 2
Banking regulation and collateral
screening in a model of information
asymmetry
2.1 Introduction
Following the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, regulators and policy makers have
increased their focus on ensuring stability in the banking sector. One key tool at
the regulator’s disposal is stress-testing, which has become more widely used by
regulators since the financial crisis. The US led the way on stress-testing, with
one of the first post-crisis stress-tests being the US Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP) which was conducted by the Federal Reserve early in 2009. The
SCAP and its successor, the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR)
aim to ensure that the largest US banks have sufficient capital to survive the stress
scenario. One important innovation of the SCAP and CCAR is that the results were
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publicly disclosed on a bank-by-bank basis. This creates a strong incentive for the
banks to have sufficient policies and capital in place to ensure they are able to pass
the stress-test.
There is some evidence to suggest that the use of these stress-tests by the Fed-
eral Reserve, and similar programs used by other banking regulators may have neg-
ative consequences. For example, Acharya et al. (2018), focussing on lending
to large firms in the US, find that stress-tested banks reduce the quantity of loans
supplied to firms and increase borrowing rates. Similarly, Cortés et al. (2018) doc-
ument negative effects of stress-testing on small business loans. Specifically, they
provide evidence that stress-tests conducted under the CCAR led to a decrease in
affected banks’ credit supply to small business. An overview of the recent history
of stress-testing in the financial sector can be found in Dent et al. (2016).
In this paper, I propose an adverse selection credit market model with aggregate
uncertainty where collateral plays a dual role. The banking sector features perfect
competition and a bank earning zero expected profit in the presence of aggregate
uncertainty makes a loss in bad aggregate states and a positive profit in the good
aggregate state. This suggests a role for banking regulation to ensure that bank
losses in bad aggregate states are not large enough to threaten the financial stability
of the economy. To model this, I propose a reduced form version of a stress-test
where firms face a regulatory constraint on the losses they are permitted to make on
loans in the bad aggregate state.
Collateral in this model plays two roles. First, it can help mitigate the adverse
selection problem by acting as a screening device. Second, it helps the bank satisfy
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the regulatory constraint by reducing the loss given default that the bank suffers in
bad states of the world.
This paper is directly related to the literature on adverse selection in credit
markets. Papers that focus on the use of collateral as a screening device in credit
markets featuring adverse selection include papers such as Besanko and Thakor
(1987) and Lacker (2001). The possibility of pooling and credit rationing equilibria
were raised by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Bester (1987) amongst others. This
paper contributes to this literature by studying the interaction between the regula-
tory constraint and the adverse selection problem. This paper also complements
the empirical literature on the impact of regulatory stress-testing on banks such as
Acharya et al. (2018) and Cortés et al. (2018) by providing a theoretical mechanism
through which more stringent stress-testing can impact lending outcomes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Environment
Firms are risk neutral and live for one period. They have access to a risky tech-
nology and are heterogeneous in the riskiness of their technology. There are two
discrete firm types indexed by i∈ {L,H} with H-type firms featuring a higher prob-
ability of success than L-type firms. A firm that invests ki in the initial period will
produce output yi = (ki)
v where v ∈ (0,1) if successful and will produce zero out-
put if unsuccessful. The probability of the risky technology producing successfully
depends on both the firm type and the aggregate state of the economy zt ∈ {zR,zB}
where zt is iid over time. For a given aggregate state zt , the probability of a risky
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project being successful takes two possible values pi (zt) ∈ {pL (zt) , pH (zt)}. The
H-type firms are assumed to be more successful in all states thus
pH (zt)> pL (zt) ∀zt ∈ {zR,zB} (2.1)
It is also assumed that all firms are more successful in a boom (zB) than a recession
(zR), thus
pi (zB)> pi (zR) ∀i ∈ {L,H} (2.2)
The economy is populated by a unit mass of firms. The mass of H-type firms is
denoted by µ ∈ (0,1) while the mass of L-type firms is 1− µ . There is imperfect
information as firms are aware of their type when making their decisions but the
banks are not. Banks are aware of the distribution of firms in the economy. The
expected probability of success for each agent before the realisation of the aggregate
shock is defined as
p˜i ≡ Prob(zt = zB) pi (zB)+ [1−Prob(zt = zB)] pi (zR)
It follows from (2.1) and (2.2) that p˜H ≥ p˜L.
Firms enter the period with no assets and receive an endowment W at the end of
the period. In order to invest in the project, firms must enter into a loan contract with
a bank. It is assumed that the bank can observe the size of the firm’s endowment. As
the endowment is received at the end of the period, firms cannot use it to invest in a
project but as banks observe W , firms are able to pledge this wealth as collateral.
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Banks are risk neutral and competitive and are funded by insured depositors
who earn a risk-free return denoted by (1+ r). Credit contracts between banks and
firms of type i are denoted by the triple θi = {Ri,ki,ηi} where Ri is the interest rate
charged to the firm by the bank, ki is the size of the loan and ηi ∈ [0,W ] is the amount
of collateral sacrificed by the firm if it chooses to default on the payment Riki.
The end-of-period endowment forms the upper-bound on the amount of pledgeable
collateral, while non-negative collateral (insurance) is ruled out.
Firms have limited liability and pay the payment Riki only if the project is suc-
cessful. The bank is unable to stake a claim on the firm’s end-of-period endowment
W unless this is agreed upon between the two parties beforehand through posting
collateral.
It is assumed that any contracts made between the bank and the firm cannot
be contingent on the aggregate state. To motivate this assumption, consider the
idea that the bank only learns of the aggregate state through defaults within its
own loan book, if loans do not all default simultaneously, the bank is unable to
enforce state-contingent payoffs to those served first. In order to treat all borrowers
within a period equally, the bank must choose contracts that are not contingent on
the aggregate state. This assumption and its motivation is similar to the sequential
service assumption made in the bank run literature as discussed in Allen and Gale
(2009).
The bank has a lower valuation of the posted collateral than the firm itself. It
is assumed that firms value collateral at its face value of ηi while banks value it at
a discounted rate γηi with γ ∈ (0,1). This assumption makes pledging collateral
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costly. The expected profit firm i receives from a loan θi = {Ri,ki,ηi} is
uFi (θi) = p˜i [(ki)
v−Riki]− (1− p˜i)ηi+W (2.3)
The expected profit a bank makes on offering contract θi to a type i firm is
uBi (θi) = p˜iRiki+(1− p˜i)γηi− (1+ r)ki (2.4)
2.2.2 A regulatory stress-test
It is assumed that the aggregate state is not known when contracts are set and the
aggregate state is not contractable. Thus, if the loan is not fully collateralised, the
loan is risky and the return is correlated with the aggregate state zt . The bank may
not have sufficient funds to repay the depositors should a recession occur, in which
case the regulator will tax (lump sum) banks in the boom while making payments
to depositors in a recession.
In order to reduce its exposure to the aggregate state, the regulator is able to
perform a stress-test of the banking sector. As the model has only two aggregate
states, the stress scenario will simply be the recession state zR. The stress-test is
parametrised by σ ∈ [0,1], which is the hurdle rate associated with the test. To
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that in order to pass the stress test, each contract1
1The assumption that the stress-test applies to each contract is more restrictive than if the stress-
test applied to the portfolio of contracts offered. It can be motivated by appealing to the idea that
banks are small and may only offer one contract in equilibrium.
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must have an expected payoff conditional on zR of at least σ (1+ r)ki such that
pi (zR)Riki+(1− pi (zR))γηi ≥ σ (1+ r)ki (2.5)
This is equivalent to stating that the bank must make a loss on each loan no greater
than (1−σ)(1+ r)ki when zt = zR. Additionally, it is assumed that the penalty for
a firm failing the stress-test is infinite such that equation (2.5) is a constraint in the
contracting problem.
The hurdle rate σ captures the severity of the stress-test. If σ = 0 then there
is no restriction on loan risk. If σ = 1, in order to pass the stress-test, the bank is
required to have sufficient funds to repay depositors in all states of the world and all
loans must be fully collateralised.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Concept
The possible non-existence of a competitive Nash equilibrium in models with asym-
metric information has been documented in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson
(1977) and Riley (1979). To ensure that a competitive equilibrium exists, this paper
adopts the concept of a Riley reactive equilibrium as described in Riley (1979).
A set of equilibrium contracts is a Riley reactive equilibrium if for any addi-
tional contract which generates an expected profit to the bank that makes the offer,
there exists another contract which would yield a gain to the second bank and losses
to the first.
The use of a Riley reactive equilibrium rules out a pooling equilibria in most
situations and thus places a stronger requirement on the existence of pooling equi-
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libria. An alternative equilibrium concept that could have been adopted is the An-
ticipatory equilibrium concept described by Wilson (1977). The Anticipatory equi-
librium allows for the existence of pooling equilibria in a standard adverse selection
model and as such is less restrictive on the existence of pooling equilibria.
Due to the presence of an upper bound on collateral, W , there remains the
possibility that if this constraint binds then pooling equilibria can exist as a Riley
reactive equilibrium. The idea that a binding upper bound on collateral can dis-
tort contracts was discussed in Bester (1987). This paper shows how regulatory
constraints such as those imposed through stress-testing of banks makes it more
likely that the upper bound on collateral binds and thus more likely that a pooling
equilibria exists.
When the upper bound on collateral does not bind, pooling equilibria cannot
exist as a Riley reactive equilibrium as discussed in Riley (1979). The pooling
equilibria found in this paper as Riley reactive equilibria would also be pooling
equilibria under the Wilson Anticipatory equilibrium.
2.3 Contracting Problem
If the upper-bound on collateral does not bind, the Riley reactive equilibrium will
consist of two separating credit contracts: θi ≡ {Ri,ki,ηi}, i ∈ {L,H} where the set
of separating contracts solves the following maximisation problem
maxθL,θH {µ (p˜H [(kH)v−RHkH ]− (1− p˜H)ηH +W ) (2.6)
+(1−µ)(p˜L [(kL)v−RLkL]− (1− p˜L)ηL+W )}
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subject to
p˜H [(kH)
v−RHkH ]− (1− p˜H)ηH +W ≥ p˜H [(kL)v−RLkL]− (1− p˜H)ηL+W
(2.7)
p˜L [(kL)
v−RLkL]−(1− p˜L)ηL+W ≥ p˜L [(kH)v−RHkH ]−(1− p˜L)ηH +W (2.8)
p˜iRiki+(1− p˜i)γηi ≥ (1+ r)ki i ∈ {L,H} (2.9)
pi (zR)Riki+(1− pi (zR))γηi ≥ σ (1+ r)ki i ∈ {L,H} (2.10)
0≤ ηi ≤W i ∈ {L,H} (2.11)
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) are truth telling constraints that ensure both firm
types reveal their true type to the bank. Equation (2.9) ensures that banks make
non-negative profit in expectation. Equation (2.10) is the regulatory constraint dis-
cussed above and equation (2.11) requires that the collateral level of a contract be
non-negative, thus ruling out the bank providing insurance to the firms, while also
requiring that collateral be no greater than the firm’s total endowment.
2.3.1 Firm Preferences
To express the contract space graphically, first note that the firm’s expected payoff
can be rewritten in terms of two dimensions (pii,ηi), where pii ≡ (ki)v−Riki is the
payoff from a successful project given loan size ki and the interest rate charged on
the loan Ri.
Rewriting equation (2.3) in terms of pii and ηi, the profit for firm i given a
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generic contract θi becomes
uFi = p˜ipii− (1− p˜i)ηi+W (2.12)
The firm’s iso-profit curves are linear in (pi,η)-space with the following
marginal rate of substitution
dpi
dη
∣∣∣∣
u
=
1− p˜i
p˜i
(2.13)
The marginal rate of substitution between pi and η depends on the firm type i. Due
to the lower probability their project is successful, L-type firms have steeper iso-
profit curves and are less willing to trade higher collateral requirements for a higher
payoff if successful. As a result, in the presence of incomplete information, H-
type firms are able to separate from L-type firms through a willingness to accept a
contract with higher collateral requirement.
2.3.2 Optimal Contracts when the stress-test constraint is slack
The model presented in this paper is based on a standard collateral-screening model
with the addition of a stress-test constraint, equation (2.10). This constraint may
not bind in equilibrium, in which case the optimal contracting problem collapses
to a standard adverse selection problem. Then, so long as the firm has sufficient
wealth that the upper-bound on collateral does not bind, the optimal contracts under
imperfect information consist of two separating contracts.
I now consider in more detail the solution to the simplified problem where the
stress-test constraint, equation (2.10), does not bind. In this case, competition in
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the banking sector requires that banks earn zero expected profits and equation (2.9)
holds with strict equality. Substituting equation (2.9) into the definition of pi yields
the following equation
piZPi (ki,ηi) = (ki)
v−
(
1+ r
p˜i
)
ki+
(
1− p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi (2.14)
Equation (2.14) describes the largest feasible payoff pii to a firm of type i for a
given loan size ki and collateral requirement ηi. As the firm’s technology features
decreasing returns to scale, there is an optimal loan size kZPi which can be found
from the derivative of equation (2.14) with respect to ki and is given by
kZPi =
(
vp˜i
1+ r
) 1
1−v
(2.15)
An important feature of this simplified problem is that the optimal loan size is
independent of the size of the collateral requirement. The interest rate charged to
firms is
RZPi =
(
1+ r
p˜i
)
−
(
1− p˜i
p˜i
)(
1+ r
vp˜i
) 1
1−v
γηi (2.16)
Evaluating equation (2.14) at the optimal scale yields the following
ΠZPi (ηi) = (1− v)
(
vp˜i
1+ r
) v
1−v
+
(
1− p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi (2.17)
Equation (2.17) describes the frontier of payoffs to the firm, pii, in (pi,η)+-
space that earn banks zero expected profit. As γ ∈ (0,1), the frontier for firm i
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Contracts under full information when the stress-test
constraint is slack
is increasing in ηi but has a slope that is lower than that of the firm’s iso-profit
curves. This is because, while banks value the collateral pledged (γ > 0), they place
a lower value on collateral than firms do (γ < 1). Pledging collateral is inefficient
and it follows that absent incomplete information, the optimal contracts are the
corner solution where the frontier ΠZPi intersects the non-negativity constraint on
collateral and thus ηi = 0. When ηH = ηL = 0, it follows from equation (2.17) that
H-type firms receive a larger payoff than L-type firms due to their higher probability
of success. This is shown graphically in figure (2.1).
With incomplete information, the L-type firms would wish to masquerade as
H-type firms in order to obtain a larger payoff. Due to their higher probability of
success, H-type firms choose a contract with a positive collateral requirement in
order to separate from the L-type firms. As H-type firms have no incentive to mas-
querade as L-type firms the only truth-telling constraint that will bind in equilibrium
will be that of the L-type firm, equation (2.8). The amount of collateral required for
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Contracts under incomplete information when the stress-test
constraint is slack
separation is
η∗∗H = (1− v)
(
v
1+ r
) v
1−v
[
(p˜H)
1
1−v p˜L− p˜H (p˜L)
1
1−v
p˜H (1− p˜L)− p˜L (1− p˜H)γ
]
> 0
The collateral posted by H-type firms is strictly positive in the presence of
incomplete information. Figure 2.2 illustrates these contracts graphically.
The solution to the simplified problem is also a solution to the full problem
presented in section 2.3, when equation (2.10) does not bind. To establish when this
is the case, first note that equation (2.10) can be rewritten as
ξi p˜iRiki+(1−ξi p˜i)γηi ≥ σ (1+ r)ki (2.18)
where
ξi =
pi (zR)
p˜i
∈ (0,1)
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is the ratio of the success probability conditional on a recession to the unconditional
success probability of a firm of type i.
When equation (2.10) does not bind, competition in the banking sector ensures
that banks earn zero profits in expectation and equation (2.9) holds with strict equal-
ity. Substituting equation (2.9) into equation (2.18) yields the following inequality
(1−ξi)γηi ≥ (σ −ξi)(1+ r)ki (2.19)
As both ki and ηi are non-negative a sufficient condition for equation (2.10) to
be slack is σ ≤ ξi. The solution to the simplified problem also features ηL = 0 and
thus σ ≤ ξL is also a necessary condition for this to be part of the solution to the
full problem.
2.3.3 Full Information Contracts with the stress-test constraint
If the stress-test constraint becomes sufficiently tight, to the extent that σ > ξi,
equation (2.19) shows that the stress-test constraint, equation (2.10), must bind for
sufficiently low collateral and thus the frontier is no longer fully characterised by
equation (2.17). I now characterise the contract frontier in the case where σ > ξi,
which I denote by Πi (ηi).
From equation (2.19) it follows that when σ > ξi equation (2.10) is slack if
the contract features sufficiently high collateral. In this case, the optimal contract
features a constant loan size, ki, regardless of the collateral required. This loan
size is defined by equation (2.15). Substituting this into equation (2.19) above and
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rearranging yields a cutoff level of collateral η¯ZPi defined by
η¯ZPi =
1
γ
(
σ −ξi
1−ξi
)(
1
1+ r
) v
1−v
(vp˜i)
1
1−v (2.20)
such that with ηi ≥ η¯ZPi , banks earn zero profit when offering the frontier contracts.
In this region of the frontier, equation (2.9) binds while the stress-test con-
straint, equation (2.10), is slack. When collateral is higher than the cutoff value
η¯ZPi , the frontier will be characterised by equation (2.17) and Πi (η) =ΠZPi (η).
Now consider the case where the stress-test constraint, equation (2.10), binds
and the banks earn strictly positive profits in expectation so that equation (2.9) is
slack. To derive the contract frontier in this situation, first substitute equation (2.10)
into the definition of pi to yield the following
piRCi (ki,ηi) = (ki)
v− σ
ξi
(
1+ r
p˜i
)
ki+
( 1
ξi
− p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi (2.21)
Equation (2.21) describes the contract frontier in terms of loan size ki and col-
lateral requirement ηi. There is an optimal loan size kRCi , independent of collateral,
which can be found from the derivative of equation (2.21) with respect to ki and is
given by
kRCi =
[(
ξi
σ
)(
vp˜i
1+ r
)] 1
1−v
(2.22)
The interest rate charged to firms is
RRCi =
(
σ
ξi
)(
1+ r
p˜i
)
−
( 1
ξi
− p˜i
p˜i
)[(
σ
ξi
)(
1+ r
vp˜i
)] 1
1−v
γηi (2.23)
2.3. Contracting Problem 33
Evaluating equation (2.21) at the optimal loan size yields the following
ΠRCi (ηi) = (1− v)
[(
ξi
σ
)
vp˜i
1+ r
] v
1−v
+
( 1
ξi
− p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi (2.24)
The frontier defined above is a solution to the full problem whenever equation
(2.10) binds and equation (2.9) is slack. This occurs when the following inequality
is satisfied
(σ −ξi)(1+ r)ki > (1−ξi)γηi (2.25)
The above inequality will hold when collateral is sufficiently low and σ is suffi-
ciently high.
Substituting in the optimal loan size specified by equation (2.22) yields the
following cutoff for collateral
η¯RCi =
1
γ
(
σ −ξi
1−ξi
)(
1
1+ r
) v
1−v
[(
ξi
σ
)
vp˜i
] 1
1−v
(2.26)
such that the frontier of contracts with ηi ≤ η¯RCi feature a binding stress-test con-
straint, equation (2.10), while banks earn positive profit and equation (2.9) will be
slack. For collateral values lower than the cutoff value η¯RCi , the frontier will be
characterised by equation (2.24) and Πi (η) =ΠRCi (η).
Comparison of the cutoffs, equation (2.20) and equation (2.26) yields the fol-
lowing strict inequality
η¯RCi < η¯
ZP
i
As σ > ξi it follows that kRCi < k
ZP
i and thus the frontier contracts in the region
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η < η¯RCi features a lower loan size than the frontier contracts in the region η ≥
η¯ZPi . Furthermore, it follows from above that there is an interval ηi ∈
(
η¯RCi , η¯
ZP
i
)
where both the stress-test constraint, equation (2.10), and the bank profit constraint,
equation (2.9), bind.
When equation (2.9) and equation (2.10) both bind, they can be combined to
yield an equation for ki as a function of the collateral requirement ηi. This is given
by the following equation
kBCi =
(
1
1+ r
)(
1−ξi
σ −ξi
)
ηi (2.27)
Similarly, the interest rate can be written as
RBCi = (1+ r)
(
1−σ +(σ −ξi) p˜i
(1−ξi) p˜i
)
(2.28)
The frontier of feasible contracts in the case where equation (2.9) and equation
(2.10) both bind, denoted as ΠBCi (ηi), can be found by substituting equation (2.27)
and equation (2.28) into the definition of pi which gives
ΠBCi (ηi) =
[(
1
1+ r
)(
1−ξi
σ −ξi
)
γ
]v
ηvi −
1
p˜i
[(
1−ξi
σ −ξi
)
− (1− p˜i)
]
γηi (2.29)
Over the interval ηi ∈
(
η¯RCi , η¯
ZP
i
)
, Πi (ηi) =ΠBCi (ηi).
The frontier of feasible contracts in the case of σ > ξi can be summarised by
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the following
Πi (ηi) =

(1− v)
[(
ξi
σ
)(
vp˜i
1+r
)] v
1−v
+
( 1
ξi
−p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi η ≤ η¯RCi[( 1
1+r
)( 1−ξi
σ−ξi
)
γ
]v
ηvi − 1p˜i
[(
1−ξi
σ−ξi
)
− (1− p˜i)
]
γηi η ∈
(
η¯RCi , η¯
ZP
i
)
(1− v)
(
vp˜i
1+r
) v
1−v
+
(
1−p˜i
p˜i
)
γηi η ≥ η¯ZPi
(2.30)
The derivative of Πi (ηi) with respect to ηi is:
∂Πi
∂ηi
=

( 1
ξi
−p˜i
p˜i
)
γ η ≤ η¯RCi
v
[( 1
1+r
)( 1−ξi
σ−ξi
)
γ
]v
ηv−1i − 1p˜i
[(
1−ξi
σ−ξi
)
− (1− p˜i)
]
γ η ∈ (η¯RCi , η¯ZPi )(
1−p˜i
p˜i
)
γ η ≥ η¯ZPi
(2.31)
The gradient ∂Πi∂ηi always remains within the interval
[(
1−p˜i
p˜i
)
γ,
( 1
ξi
−p˜i
p˜i
)
γ
]
and is
steepest when η ≤ η¯RCi . A requirement for the equilibrium contract to be an interior
solution is that the gradient of the contract frontier at ηi = 0 is steeper than the iso-
profit constraint. This holds if the following condition is satisfied
γ
ξi
+(1− γ) p˜i > 1 (2.32)
When the above inequality is satisfied, the full-information contracts are an interior
solution featuring ηi > 0 and can be illustrated graphically by the point where the
frontier Πi (ηi) is tangent to firm i’s iso-profit curve. This case is illustrated by
figure 2.3 and the result is formally stated in the proposition below.
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Figure 2.3: Frontier of feasible contracts when σ > ξ
Proposition 2.1. If σ > ξi and γξi + (1− γ) p˜i > 1 the full information compet-
itive equilibrium contract for firm i will feature strictly positive collateral ηi ∈(
η¯RCi , η¯
ZP
i
)
and equation (2.9) and equation (2.10) will bind.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.1
The optimal contract at the interior solution, when the conditions set out in
proposition 2.6.1 are statisfied, is denoted by θ ∗i ≡ {R∗i ,η∗i ,k∗i } with the individual
terms given by
k∗i =
 vp˜i (1−ξi)
(1+ r)
(
1−ξi+(σ −ξi)
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
)
 11−v (2.33)
η∗i =
1
γ
(σ −ξi)
(
1−ξi
1+ r
) v
1−v
 vp˜i
1−ξi+(σ −ξi)
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
 11−v (2.34)
R∗i =
[
1− (1− p˜i)
(
σ −ξi
1−ξi
)](
1+ r
p˜i
)
(2.35)
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The contract terms specified above highlight the distortion resulting from the
stress-test constraint, equation (2.10). Both the loan size k∗i and the interest rate
charged are decreasing in σ and, for σ > ξi, they lie strictly below the values offered
when the stress-test constraint does not bind. The collateral level η∗i is now strictly
positive, whether it is increasing or decreasing in σ depends on the parameter values
of the model. The proposition below sets out more formally the requirements for
η∗i to be increasing in σ .
Proposition 2.2. The collateral requirement of the full information optimal contract
when σ > ξi and γξi +(1− γ) p˜i > 1 is increasing in σ if
(1−v
v
)( γ
1−γ
)
> (1− p˜i)
and decreasing in σ otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.2.
To understand why required collateral may be decreasing in σ , first note that
an increase in σ requires the bank to reduce the aggregate risk of the loan contract.
This can be achieved either by increasing the collateral required or by reducing the
size of the loan. As γ < 1, the use of collateral is costly and if the cost of collateral is
sufficiently high (low γ) and the returns to scale of the project sufficiently large (high
v), it may be optimal to reduce both the loan size and the collateral requirement in
order to pass the stress-test.
The possibility of a corner solution when σ > ξi is set out in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.3. If σ > ξi and γξi +(1− γ) p˜i < 1 the full-information competitive
equilibrium contract for firm i features ηi = 0, ki = kRCi and Ri = R
RC
i . Equation
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(2.9) holds as a strict inequality and thus banks make positive profit in expectation.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.1
If the condition for an interior solution is not satisfied, γξi +(1− γ) p˜i < 1, the
slope of the frontier Πi is always strictly less than the slope of the iso-profit curves
of firm i for all ηi and the optimal collateral requirement will be at the lower-bound
with ηi = 0.
2.3.4 Incomplete Information Contracts with the stress-test con-
straint
To simplify the analysis that follows, I make two additional assumptions. First I
assume that γξi +(1− γ) p˜i > 1 for i ∈ {L,H} so that the full information contracts
feature positive collateral requirements. Second, I assume that the ratio of success
probability in the bad aggregate state to the expected success probability is the same
for both firm types and thus ξ = ξH = ξL. Given the second assumption, the feasible
frontier of contracts will be concave for both firm types above the same threshold
σ .
In the presence of incomplete information, the banks are unable to condition
contracts on the firm type. As before, the relative slope of the firms’ iso-profit lines
means H-type firms are able to separate from L-type firms by accepting a contract
with a larger collateral requirement. However, as shown in the previous section, the
full-information contracts feature positive collateral and thus it is not immediately
clear that either truth-telling constraint is violated by the full-information contracts.
As a first step, it is important to understand the shape of the contract frontiers
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for the two firm types. First note that ΠL (0) < ΠH (0) and thus the frontier for
L-type firms lies below that of H-type firms. The following proposition establishes
that ΠL and ΠH cross exactly once.
Proposition 2.4. The frontiers of feasible contracts for the two firm types ΠL and
ΠH will cross exactly once in (pi,η)+-space for any σ ∈ [ξ ,1] at a point η˜ > ηZPL .
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.3.
It follows immediately from the above proposition that the frontier of con-
tracts for the H-type firm lies above that of the L-type firm at the L-type firm’s
full-information contract, ΠH (η∗L)>ΠL (η∗L). Thus the H-type firm would strictly
prefer one its own full-information contract to that of the L-type firm and its truth-
telling constraint, equation (2.7), will not bind. The relevant truth-telling constraint
is equation (2.8).
To understand when equation (2.8) binds, I define the function φL as the profit
L-type firms receives from their full information contract less the profit they would
receive from from the H-type firm’s contract
φL ≡ p˜Lpi∗L− (1− p˜L)η∗L− p˜Lpi∗H +(1− p˜L)η∗H (2.36)
If φL ≥ 0, the truth-telling constraint of L-type firms is satisfied at the full infor-
mation contracts and there is no need for H-type firms to accept a higher collateral
level in order to separate from L-type firms. If on the other hand φL < 0, the truth-
telling constraint for L-type firms is not satisfied at the full information contracts
and equation (2.8) binds in the incomplete information case.
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The lower-limit of φL as σ → ξ is
lim
σ→ξ
{φL}=
[(
p˜L
p˜H
) v
1−v
−1
][
v
v
1−v − v 11−v
]
< 0 (2.37)
For sufficiently low σ equation (2.8) will bind and H-type firms must accept higher
collateral requirements in order to separate from L-type firms.
As the full-information contracts feature positive collateral requirements, un-
like in the standard adverse selection model, even with imperfect information the
truth-telling constraint may not bind as illustrated by the upper-limit of φL as σ → 1
lim
σ→1
{φL}= v v1−v
(1− v)
 p˜L+ 1γ
(
p˜L
p˜H
− p˜L
)
p˜L+ 1γ (1− p˜L)

v
1−v
+ v
 p˜H + 1γ
(
p˜H
p˜L
− p˜H
)
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
−1
> 0
(2.38)
The value of φL is strictly positive as σ→ 1 and thus for sufficiently high values
of σ , equation (2.8) does not bind. Appendix 2.6.4 shows that there is a threshold
σ¯L above which φL > 0. For σ ≥ σ¯L both equations (2.7) and (2.8) will not bind at
the full-information contracts and thus neither firm has an incentive to deviate from
their full-information contracts, even in the imperfect information setting. This is
stated formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 2.5. There exists a threshold σ¯L ∈ (ξ ,1) above which the truth-telling
constraint for L-type firms, equation (2.8), does not bind at the equilibrium separat-
ing contracts and below which it does bind at the equilibrium separating contracts.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.4.
The separating contract for H-type firms when σ ∈ (ξ , σ¯L) and assuming that
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Figure 2.4: Asymmetric Information Contracts when σ > ξ
the wealth constraint does not bind, denoted by θˆH , can be found as the point on
the frontier ΠH at which L-type firms are indifferent between this contract and their
full-information contract θ ∗L . An example of this intersection is illustrated in figure
2.4.
For brevity, I omit the precise contract terms for H-type firms in the case
where equation (2.8) binds as their precise formulation will depend on whether
ηˆH is larger than η¯ZPH or not. From the properties of the contract frontier ΠH , in
addition to a higher collateral requirement, it follows that the separating contract
features a strictly larger loan size and a weakly lower interest rate relative to the
full-information contract.
2.3.5 Contracts when the wealth constraint binds
I have assumed up to this point that firms have sufficient wealth to supply the col-
lateral required by the bank and the upper-bound on collateral did not bind. I now
relax this assumption and study the impact of a binding upper-bound on collateral
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Figure 2.5: Contracts with binding wealth constraint when σ > ξ
on the optimal contracts.
In the absence of incomplete information, the binding wealth constraint distorts
the contract terms when η∗i >W . In this case the contract still lies on the frontier of
feasible contracts at the point Πi (W ).
If the incentive compatibility constraint and the wealth constraint both bind
such that ηˆH >W , the H-type firm’s contract lies below the frontierΠH . This case is
illustrated in figure 2.5. The payoff pi that the H-type firm receives when the wealth
constraint binds pi∗H = p¯iL (θL,W ) can be found from the incentive compatibility
constraint, equation (2.8), given the contract that the L-type firm receives θL and the
upper bound on collateral W
p¯iL (θL,W ) = (kL)v− kLRL+
(
1− p˜L
p˜L
)
(W −ηL)
When the wealth constraint binds, the H-type firm’s contract lies off the fron-
tier of contracts that satisfy equation (2.9) and equation (2.10) and the firm is in-
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different between any pair of contract terms {kH ,RH} which yields a payoff of
p¯iL (θL,W ). However, a bank can maximise its profit by offering the optimal loan
size kZPH , subject to the regulatory constraint (2.10), and increasing the interest rate
charged to firms above the value RZPH , earning strictly positive profit in expectation.
2.3.6 Pooling Contracts
When H-type firms pledge their entire wealth as collateral such that the upper-
bound on collateral binds, there is the possibility of pooling contracts existing as
a Riley Reactive Equilibrium. In a pooling contract, both H-type and L-type firms
receive the same contract θP = {RP,kP,ηP}. The expected probability of success
conditional on aggregate state zt is simply a weighted average of the success proba-
bilities for L-type and H-type firms, weighted by the proportion of that firm type in
the economy
pP (zt) = µ pH (zt)+(1−µ) pL (zt)
Again assuming that ξ is the same for both firm types, it follows that the uncondi-
tional expected probability of success is also a weighted average of the L-type and
H-type probabilities
p˜P = µ p˜H +(1−µ) p˜L
The frontier of feasible pooling contracts ΠP for σ > ξ can be calculated as in
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the separating case but using the pooling probabilities such that
ΠP (η)=

(1− v)
[(
ξ
σ
)(
vp˜P
1+r
)] v
1−v
+
(
1
ξ−p˜P
p˜P
)
γηi if η ≤ η¯RCP[( 1
1+r
)( 1−ξ
σ−ξ
)
γ
]v
ηvi − 1p˜P
[(
1−ξ
σ−ξ
)
− (1− p˜P)
]
γηi if η ∈
(
η¯RCP , η¯
ZP
P
)
(1− v)
(
vp˜P
1+r
) v
1−v
+
(
1−p˜P
p˜P
)
γηP if η ≥ η¯ZPP
(2.39)
Where the thresholds η¯RCP and η¯
ZP
P are found by substituting the pooling proba-
bilities into equations (2.26) and (2.20). An important property of ΠP is that for
any µ ∈ (0,1) and any σ ∈ [0,1) it crosses ΠL and ΠP exactly once. This follows
from the single-crossing condition of ΠL and ΠH and noting that for any µ ∈ (0,1)
p˜P ∈ (p˜L, p˜H).
For a pooling contract θP to exist as a Riley Reactive Equilibrium, there must
exist no deviating contract that would satisfy equations (2.9) and (2.10) while mak-
ing the pooling contract either unprofitable or violate the stress-test constraint. That
is, there cannot exist a cream-skimming contract.
It follows that a necessary condition for the existence of a pooling contract is
for both L-type and H-type firms to prefer the pooling contract to the best separating
contracts available, otherwise the firms would choose the separating contracts over
the pooling contracts. Similarly, any pooling contract must lie on the frontier ΓP of
pooling contracts, otherwise a better pooling contract could be found that would be
preferred by both types of firm.
Furthermore, as any pooling contract that attracts L-type firms occurs at a
point where ΠH (ηP) > ΠP (ηP), in most cases there will exist a profitable cream-
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skimming contract which will satisfy equations (2.9) and (2.10). Due to the relative
slope of firm iso-profit lines, a cream-skimming contract will feature a higher payoff
pi in addition to a higher collateral requirement η than the pooling contract such that
H-type firms will choose the cream-skimming contract to the pooling contract while
L-type firms would prefer the pooling contract. Should such a cream-skimming con-
tract exist, the pooling contract would be left with only L-type firms and the pooling
contract would no longer be profitable.
However, the existence of a cream-skimming contract depends on the ability
of H-type firms to accept a contract with higher collateral than the pooling contract.
If the upper-bound on collateral binds at the pooling contract such that ηP = W ,
no contract with higher collateral can be offered and thus there exists no cream-
skimming contract. In this case, the pooling contract survives as a Riley Reactive
Equilibrium. This result is set out more formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 2.6. A pooling contract θP will be a Riley Reactive Equilibrium if i) the
wealth constraint on collateral binds ηP = W, ii) the contract lies on the frontier
of feasible pooling contracts piP = ΠP (W ) and iii) L-type firms strictly prefer the
pooling contract to their separating contract ΠP (W )> p¯iL (θL,W )
Proof. First note that if ΠP (W ) > p¯iL (θL,W ) then it follows that the separating
contract for H-type firms features ηˆH =W and pˆiH = p¯iL (θL,W ); thus both H-type
and L-type firms will prefer the pooling contract to their separating contract. Next
note that as piP =ΠP (W ), the pooling contract lies on the feasible frontier and thus
there exists no pooling contracts that are preferred by either agent to θP. Finally,
as ηP =W there exist no deviating contracts that only one agent type would prefer
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Figure 2.6: Pooling Contracts when σ > ξ
to the pooling contract and thus there does not exist any deviating contract that any
agent type prefers and would satisfy equations (2.9) and (2.10).
An example of a pooling contract existing as a Riley reactive equilibrium is
illustrated in figure 2.6 in a case where σ > ξ . The stress-test constraint increases
the amount of collateral required by contracts and hence makes it more likely that
the upper-bound on collateral binds. However, pooling contracts may exist even
when σ ≤ ξ if W is sufficiently low. For example, in the extreme case of W = 0, a
pooling equilibrium exists for all values of σ because separation of types through
collateral requirements is not possible.
The precise terms of the pooling contract, as in the separating case, depend
where the contract is located on the frontier. More generally, the pooling contract
results in a misallocation of capital relative to the separating contracts case. With
separating contracts, H-type firms receive a larger loan size than L-type firms, re-
flecting the higher success rate of H-type firms. In a pooling equilibria, all contract
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terms, including capital are the same across firm times and the market no longer
allocates more capital to firms with a higher probability of success.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper presented a one-dimensional adverse selection model of firm financing
where lenders face a stress-test constraint that restricts the losses they can make in
a recession. As the stress-test constraint tightens, banks value collateral not only as
a screening device but also as a way of reducing the risk of loans. When the stress-
test constraint on bank losses becomes sufficiently tight, for example following a
financial crisis, the collateral requirements for loans increases and the ability of
banks to screen firms may suffer.
The key result of this paper is that the tightening of the stress-test hurdle rate
can result in a misallocation of capital as a result of a switch from separating con-
tracts, where less risky firms get better credit terms to a pooling contract where
firms of differing riskiness get the same contracting terms. This misallocation of
capital is shown to lower aggregate productivity; something that is not normally as-
sociated with financial friction models where lower quality firms are usually offered
relatively worse credit terms following a crisis. This result suggests policy makers
should exercise caution when imposing regulatory constraint on banks. This also
applies to stress-testing to the extent that announcing publicly the results of regula-
tory stress-tests will impose implicit capital requirements on banks.
This paper also emphasises the interaction between a firm’s pledgeable col-
lateral and the impact of banking regulation. The misallocation which occurs in a
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pooling equilibria can only occur if firms have insufficient pledgeable collateral. If
on the other hand, firms have access to sufficient collateral, the tightening of the
regulatory constraint may be beneficial in forcing an increased use in collateral and
consequently a fall in lending risk.
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2.6 Appendix for Chapter 2
2.6.1 Proof of proposition 2.3
Consider the Lagrangian associated with maximising equation (2.6) subject to the
bank’s zero profit condition, (2.9) the liquidity restriction (2.10) and the non-
negativity constraint (2.11). To simplify the FOCs I denote Ti = Riki Assume σ > ξ
and thus the stress-test constraint binds
Li = ∑
i
{µi (p˜i [(ki)v−Ti]− (1− p˜i)ηi+W )
+λ iB [p˜iTi+(1− p˜i)γηi− (1+ r)ki]+∑
i
λ i−η ηi
+ λ iσ [pi (zR)Ti+(1− pi (zR))γηi−σ (1+ r)ki]
}
Where µH = µ and µL = 1−µ .
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂ki
= µivp˜i (ki)v−1− (1+ r)
(
λ iB+σλ
i
σ
)
∂L
∂ηi
=−µi (1− p˜i)+λ iB (1− p˜i)γ+λ iσ (1− pi (zR))γ+λ i−η
such
∂L
∂Ti
=−µi p˜i+λ iB p˜i+λ iσ pi (zR)
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If ηi > 0 and thus λ i−η = 0 the other two multipliers are:
λ iσ = µi
(
1− p˜i
1−ξ
)(
1− γ
γ
)
and:
λ iB = µi
[
1−ξ
(
1− p˜i
1−ξ
)(
1− γ
γ
)]
For this to be an equilibrium we require λ iB > 0 and thus:
1 > ξ
(
1− p˜i
1−ξ
)(
1− γ
γ
)
which implies:
1− pi (zR)
pi (zR)
γ <
1− p˜i
p˜i
(2.40)
Thus whenever equation (2.40) holds, the equilibrium will feature positive col-
lateral ηi > 0 and the banks will make zero expected profit.
If instead equation (2.40) does not hold, then it follows from above that λ iB = 0
and thus the banks will make positive profits. Combining ∂L∂ηi and
∂L
∂Ti
when λ iB = 0
implies that λ i−η > 0 and thus ηi = 0. It follows from this that whenever (2.40) fails
to hold, banks make positive profits in expectation and ηi = 0.
2.6.2 Proof of proposition 2.2
Collateral when σ > ξ and the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind is:
η∗i =
1
γ
(σ −ξ )
(
1−ξ
1+ r
) v
1−v
 vp˜i
1−ξ +(σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
 11−v
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To see whether this is increasing in σ , simply consider the derivative of η∗i
with respect to σ which can be written as:
∂η∗i
∂σ
=
1
γ
(
1−ξ
1+ r
) v
1−v
 vp˜i
1−ξ +(σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
 11−v
×
1− 11−v (σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
1−ξ +(σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)

For this derivative to be positive we require:
1 >
1
1−v (σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
1−ξ +(σ −ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(1− p˜i)
which simplifies to:
1−ξ > v
1− v (σ −ξ )
(
1
γ
−1
)
(1− p˜i)
For this to hold for all σ ∈ [0,1]we require the above to hold at σ = 1 which implies:
(
1− v
v
)(
γ
1− γ
)
> (1− p˜i)
Thus so long as the above condition holds, the derivative of η∗i with respect to σ is
always strictly positive and thus η∗i increases at higher values of σ .
2.6.3 Proof of proposition 2.4
Note that for any σ and any η , the non-linear section of the frontiers are such that:
Π∗H (η) > Π∗L (η) ∀σ ∈ [0,1). Note also that ΠBi (η) ≥ Π∗i (η) ∀η ∈
[
0, η¯Ai
]
and
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thus it follows that the frontiers cross exactly once if the crossing point of ΠBL and
ΠBH occurs after ηAL . For this to occur, first define the crossing point between ΠBL
and ΠBH by η˜ which can be found from the following equation:
(
pH (zL)
σ (1+ r)
) v
1−v [
v
v
1−v − v 11−v
]
+
1− pH (zL)
pH (zL)
γη˜ =(
pL (zL)
σ (1+ r)
) v
1−v [
v
v
1−v − v 11−v
]
+
1− pL (zL)
pL (zL)
γη˜
Rearranging yields an equation for η˜ :
η˜ =
1
γ
(
v
σ (1+ r)
) v
1−v
(1− v)
(
[pH (zL)]
v
1−v − [pL (zL)]
v
1−v
)( pH (zL) pL (zL)
pH (zL)− pL (zL)
)
Now note that for single crossing we require:
η˜ ≥ ηAL
Substituting the equations for η˜ and ηAL and simplifying yields:
(1− v)
(
[pH (zL)]
v
1−v − [pL (zL)]
v
1−v
)( pH (zL) pL (zL)
pH (zL)− pL (zL)
)
≥ v
σ
(
σ −ξ
1−ξ
)
[pL (zL)]
1
1−v
Note that the RHS is maximised when σ = 1 thus the above will hold for any
σ ∈ [0,1] if the following holds:
(
1− v
v
)(
[pH (zL)]
v
1−v − [pL (zL)]
v
1−v
)( pH (zL) pL (zL)
pH (zL)− pL (zL)
)
≥ [pL (zL)]
1
1−v
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This simplifies and rearranges to:
(
p˜H
p˜L
)
≥
[
1
1− v
(
p˜H
p˜L
− v
)]1−v
Now note that at p˜Hp˜L = 1 the above holds with equality i.e.
1 =
[
1
1− v (1− v)
]1−v
Also note that:
∂
∂
(
p˜H
p˜L
) {( p˜H
p˜L
)
−
[
1
1− v
(
p˜H
p˜L
− v
)]1−v}
= 1−
[
1− v
p˜H
p˜L
− v
]v
This derivative is greater than zero for all p˜Hp˜L > 1 and thus it follows that η
A
L < η˜
and thus ΓL and ΓH cross exactly once at a point γ > ηBL .
2.6.4 Proof of proposition 2.5
Equation (2.36) can be written for the interval σ ∈ (ξ ,1] as:
φL =
 p˜Lp˜H
(
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
))
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜L+ 1γ (1− p˜L)
)

v
1−v [
v
v
1−v − v 11−v
]
−
v v1−v − v 11−v
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ
(
p˜H
p˜L
− p˜H
))
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
)

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We can write the derivative of this with respect to σ as:
∂φL
∂σ
=
1
γ
v
1
1−v
1(
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
))2 ((1−ξ )( p˜Hp˜L −1
))
− v
1− v
(
v
v
1−v − v 11−v
) p˜Lp˜H
(
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
))
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜L+ 1γ (1− p˜L)
)

v
1−v−1
 p˜Lp˜H (1−ξ )
(
1
γ −1
)
(p˜H− p˜L)(
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜L+ 1γ (1− p˜L)
))2

For the derivative to be monotonically increasing we require:
 1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜L+ 1γ (1− p˜L)
)
1−σ +(σ −ξ )
(
p˜H + 1γ (1− p˜H)
)

1
1−v (
p˜H
p˜L
) v
1−v
> (1− γ) p˜L
This will always hold as the left-hand side is strictly greater than 1 while the right-
hand side is strictly less than one. Thus we can conclude that:
∂φL
∂η
> 0
As φL < 0 when σ ≤ ξ and φL > 0 when σ = 1, the above condition is sufficient to
show that there exists a threshold σ¯L ∈ (0,1) at which point φL = 0.
Chapter 3
A Model of Credit Rationing in SME
Loan Applications
3.1 Introduction
This paper creates a modelling framework for the study of SME loan applications
that is consistent with existing survey data. Specifically, it aims to capture several
observable features of the loan market. First, firms choose whether they apply for
a loan, and if they do not apply for a loan it may be due to one of several reasons.
For example, firms may not apply for a loan because they do not need a loan. Other
firms may not apply even though they would want a loan because they believe they
will not be able to obtain a loan. A firm’s loan application may not be successful;
a firm may receive only part of the funding it had requested, or it may have its loan
application rejected outright. Firms may also choose to decline a loan offer they
thought was not acceptable. All of these cases are observed situations in the data
and suggest the existence of different types of credit rationing.
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This paper presents a modelling framework that is consistent with outcomes of
the SME loan market observed in the ’Survey on the access to finance of enterprises’
(SAFE). Firms have access to some external funding with which they can attempt
to fund a project of fixed investment size. The model presented in this paper is able
to distinguish between two reasons for firms not to apply for a loan. Firms that do
not require a bank loan are able to fund the project without a bank loan and so do
not apply for a loan. Firms that do not think they will receive a bank loan choose
not to apply but are unable to invest in the project without bank financing.
A key feature of the model is that there is uncertainty regarding the cost of the
project at the point in time that the firm applies for a loan. Unlike other models of
credit rationing which use adverse selection to generate credit rationing, such as the
classic paper Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), firms are also unaware of the cost. In these
adverse selection models, credit rationing occurs when banks are unable to distin-
guish between two firms of different types. However, these models are unable to
explain the full range of loan outcomes and reasons why firms choose not to apply
for loans. This paper explicitly models a loan application phase, where both banks
and firms face uncertainty regarding the cost of the firm’s project. Firm heterogene-
ity at the application phase results in firms endogenously choosing whether to apply
for a loan or not. The uncertainty firms face at the application stage allows firms
that apply for loans to experience the full range of loan outcomes observed in the
data.
Analysis of the SAFE survey data suggests that competition in the banking
sector may be a key determinant of SME loan outcomes. To address this possibility,
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I consider a differentiated banking sector using the spatial differentiation model of
Hotelling (1929).
This paper is related to the extensive literature on credit rationing. An overview
of the credit rationing literature can be found in Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) who dis-
tinguish between several types of credit rationing. Examples of papers which fea-
ture what Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) term ’redlining’ where all firms of a given type
are denied credit or ’pure credit rationing’ where firms of a type are randomly de-
nied credit can be found in Freimer and Gordon (1965), in a perfect information
setting and Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in an asym-
metric information setting. In addition, Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Kjenstad et
al. (2015) also discuss the case of ’price rationing’ where borrowers obtain a loan
but not of the desired size at the interest rate charged to them. Additionally, this
paper is related to the literature on competition in the lending market. Villas-Boas
and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) consider how spatial differentiation in the banking sector
affects a credit market model with asymmetric model. As in their paper I introduce
differentiation in the credit market using the Hotelling (1929) model of spatial dif-
ferentiation.
This paper extends this literature by introducing an application phase, where
firms choose whether to apply for a loan. This paper also provides a theoretical
contribution in that there is the possibility of ’pure credit rationing’ where the loan
applications of observationally equivalent firms are rejected at random in a model
without asymmetric information. This result is made possible because of the ad-
ditional loan application phase. In the model, banks compete for loan applications
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rather than loans. Banks commit to offering a loan contract conditional on the real-
isation of the cost uncertainty with a given probability to firms. In some situations
they grant loss-making loans with positive probability to encourage additional loan
applications.
The introduction of a loan application phase allows for self-selection into the
loan market and additional competition considerations. Parlour and Rajan (2001)
offer an alternative model of competition in credit markets where many lenders
simultaneously offer loan contracts to a borrower, with the borrower able to accept
more than one contract and find that a competitive banking sector can still generate
positive profit in equilibrium. Their simultaneous contracting framework however
is not well suited to analysing survey data based on a single loan application as
borrowers are able to accept multiple loan contracts. While this may be an appealing
aspect of their model, the SAFE survey data only asks firms about the outcome of
their last loan application.
3.1.1 Motivating Data
The ’Survey on the access to finance of enterprises’ (SAFE) conducted jointly by
the European Commission and the ECB is a bi-annual survey that has provided ev-
idence of the financing conditions of Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
since 2009. In order to provide summary statistics by country, I obtained the con-
fidential dataset for all the waves between 2009H1 and 2013H1 inclusive. I focus
on two survey questions and their responses for 11 Eurozone countries.1 The first
1Data was available for other other EU countries but not in every wave. I restrict my sample to
countries that appeared in every wave.
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is Q7A part a) which asks firms whether they have applied for a bank loan in the
last six months. The second is Q7B part a) which asks the firms that responded that
they had applied for a loan what the outcome of their loan application was.
The SAFE questionnaire breaks the response of whether the firm had made
a loan application into four possibilities. First, firms could respond that they had
applied for a bank loan. Second, firms could state that they did not apply for a
bank loan because of the possibility that their application would get rejected. Third,
firms could state that they did not apply for a bank loan because they had sufficient
internal funds. Finally, they could say they did not apply for a bank loan because
of another reason. Ignoring the last response, which does not add any additional
information, the survey still distinguishes between two possible reasons why a firm
may not apply for a bank loan, either they do not require a loan or they do not think
they will be able to obtain a loan.
Table 3.1 summarises the mean response to the loan application question by
each country over the period 2009H1 to 2013H1 inclusive. The difference in the
proportion of firms applying for loans across country is perhaps not surprising, but
there are still interesting differences. The mean rate of firms applying for loans
in the included countries is 24%. Italy, Spain, France and Greece all exhibit loan
application rates higher than the mean while countries like Finland, Ireland and
the Netherlands exhibit loan application rates lower than the mean. The dataset,
includes the years following the financial crisis and it is likely that part of this vari-
ation may be due to how each country fared following the financial crisis. However,
there are differences even amongst the so-called PIIGS, whose experience of the
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financial crisis was worse than that of the rest of Europe, with Ireland a particular
outlier of this group. While Italy, Spain, Greece feature a higher than average loan
application rate, the application rate in Portugal is slightly below the mean at 21%
while the application rate in Ireland is one of the lowest of the sampled countries at
17%.
Turning now to the outcome of these loan applications, the SAFE questionnaire
breaks the responses into one of four outcomes. First, firms could receive the full
loan amount that they applied for. Second, the firm only received part of the loan
that they had requested2. Third, the firm’s loan application was rejected outright by
the bank. Finally, the firm may deem the cost of the loan too high and reject the
terms offered to them by the bank. In addition, not all firms apply for bank loans.
Table 3.2 summarises the response to the loan outcome question by each coun-
try. Again, there are differences in the rejection rates across countries. Of particular
interest is the variation in outright rejections of loans where Greece, Ireland and the
Netherlands all have a rejection rate far above the mean rejection rate of 13%.
The Netherlands appears to be an interesting outlier, having the highest loan
rejection rate of 24% of the sampled countries and one of the lowest application
rates of 13%. The rejection rate in the Netherlands is comparable to Greece and
Ireland, while the application rate is comparable to Ireland, Portugal and Finland.
Unlike Greece, Portugal and Ireland the Netherlands is one of the so-called PIIGS
2The wording of this question response has changed slightly between waves. In the first wave,
firms were only able to respond ’Applied but only got part of it’. In later waves, this was broken
down into two responses ’Applied and got most of it [BETWEEN 75% AND 99%] ’ and ’Applied
but only got a limited part of it [BETWEEN 1% AND 74%]’. To allow for comparison between
waves, I group these two responses together and treat them as a response that the firm only receive
part of the loan.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of Firms applying For a Loan vs HHI
Source: ECB Banking Structural Financial Indicators and SAFE survey data
that suffered most during the financial crisis. One possible explanation for the dif-
ferences in the loan market observed in the Netherlands is that the Netherlands has
the most concentrated banking sector of the countries analysed as measured by a
mean Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of total assets between 2009 and 2013 of
0.21.
To analyse the relationship between competition in the banking sector and the
outcome of firm loans more formally, I use HHI data of total assets from the ECB.
Figure 3.1 plots the HHI of the banking sector in each country with the proportion
of firms applying for loans, which features weak negative correlation (-0.47), sug-
gesting that fewer firms apply for loans in countries that feature less competition in
the banking sector. Figure 3.2 plots the HHI of the banking sector in each country
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of Applications rejected by Bank and HHI
Source: ECB Banking Structural Financial Indicators and SAFE survey data
against the proportion of firms that apply for a loan and are rejected. This exhibits
weak positive correlation (0.55), suggesting that firms are more likely to get their
loan application rejected in countries that has less competition in the banking sector.
3.2 The Model
The model presented here is a partial equilibrium model of a credit market with
firm-specific technology shocks and imperfect financial markets. The credit market
has an explicit loan application phase, where firms choose whether or not to apply
for a bank loan. The bank then chooses whether to reject the firm’s loan application
and, if the loan application is accepted, what terms to offer the firm. The firm then
chooses whether to accept or reject the bank loan.
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A risk-neutral firm has access to a project which requires a fixed level of in-
vestment K which is common to all firms. The project generates a stochastic rate of
return z∈R+. The stochastic rate of return is realised at the end of the period and is
not known at any point during the financing process. The shock z ∈R+ is a random
variable distributed according to a Pareto distribution with a cdf given by
G(z) = 1−
(
1+
z
λ
)−η
(3.1)
where η > 1 and λ > 0 are scale parameters.
In addition to the investment level K, the firm must also pay a stochastic fixed
cost in order to produce which takes one of two discrete values ξ ∈ {ξL,ξH}, with
ξL < ξH . The fixed cost is realised after the source of the firm’s funding has been
arranged and thus the firm must choose whether to apply for a bank loan without
full information of the cost of the project. It is assumed that both values of ξ have
an equal chance of being realised.
The firm is able to finance the investment through a mixture of bank loans b and
equity e. Issuing equity is subject to an exogenous cost function, which is increasing
and convex in the amount of equity issued. In addition, there is a maximum amount
of equity that each firm is able to issue E¯ ∈ R+. This upper-bound varies across
each firm, is drawn at the beginning of the period, before the loan application is
made and is observed by both the bank and firm. To simplify the analysis, the cost
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of equity is assumed to have the following functional form
Ψ(e) = e+
ψ
2
e2 e ∈ [0, E¯] (3.2)
If a firm wishes to obtain a bank loan, they must apply before the realisation of
ξ . The loan terms, and whether or not the bank accepts the firm’s loan application,
depends on both E¯ and ξ .
A bank loan consists of a loan quantity b(E¯,ξ ), an interest rate R(E¯,ξ )
charged on the loan and a probability that the bank provides a loan ρB (E¯,ξ )∈ [0,1].
The probability, conditional on (E¯,ξ ), that the bank rejects a loan application is
1−ρB (E¯,ξ ).
Competition in the banking sector is modelled using the spatial competition
model of Hotelling (1929). There are two banks located at each end of a line of unit
length. Firms are continuously and uniformly distributed along the line. Differen-
tiation in the credit market is captured by the distance between the firms and the
banks as well as the associated travel cost. A firm that wishes to obtain a loan from
a bank must pay a linear travel cost t > 0. The location of the firm on the line is de-
noted by d ∈ [0,1] which is defined as the distance from the left endpoint of the line.
Banks are unable to observe the distance between bank and firm an thus cannot con-
dition contract terms on d. Firms are only able to apply to one of the two banks for a
loan and each bank offers a menu of contracts {b(E¯,ξi) ,R(E¯,ξi) ,ρB (E¯,ξi)}i∈{L,H}
conditional on each realisation of η . It is assumed that the bank commits to these
contracts.
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The loan is risky and firms are able to default on their repayment. If they do
default the firm is liquidated and both the firm and the bank receive nothing. The
firm is risk-neutral and looks to maximise its end of period payoff and thus will
default only in the case where it has insufficient funds to repay its loan. There exists
a threshold value of z, below which a firm with observable characteristics (E¯,ξ ) that
obtains a loan featuring interest rate R(E¯,ξ ) and loan size b(E¯,ξ ) would default
on its loan obligations. This threshold is denoted by the following equation
zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = R(E¯,ξ )b(E¯,ξ ) (3.3)
While firms do not know the realisation of ξ when they apply for a bank loan, it
is assumed they fully anticipate the loan contracts {b(E¯,ξi) ,R(E¯,ξi) ,ρB (E¯,ξi)}i∈{L,H}
that the banks offer conditional on both E¯ and ξ . To simplify the analysis I assume
that ξ , d and E¯ are all distributed independently of each other.
In order to produce, the firm must have secured sufficient funds in order to pay
both the investment K and the fixed cost ξ and so the following budget constraint
must be satisfied
K+ξ ≤ b(E¯,ξ )+ e(E¯,ξ ) (3.4)
The expected profit from producing for a firm E¯ that obtains a loan
(b(E¯,ξ ) ,R(E¯,ξ )) following the realisation of the fixed cost ξ from the bank
located at the left endpoint is
Pr{Repay}E [z|Repay]−Pr{Repay}R(E¯,ξ )b(E¯,ξ )−Ψ(e(E¯,ξ ))
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where e(E¯,ξ ) is specified by equation (3.4).
Using equation (3.3), the Pareto distribution for z defined by equation (3.1) and
the functional form for Ψ(e) yields the following
piF (E¯,ξ ) =
(
λ
η−1
)(
1+
1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)−η+1
−
(
e(E¯,ξ )+
ψ
2
[e(E¯,ξ )]2
)
(3.5)
The expected profit net of travel costs of the firm depends on the distance it is
located from the left endpoint and is
uF (d, E¯,ξ ) = piF (E¯,ξ )− td (3.6)
Similarly, if the firm finances their project with a loan from the bank located at
the right endpoint receives the following expected profit net of travel costs
uCF (d, E¯,ξ ) = pi
C
F (E¯,ξ )− t (1−d) (3.7)
where piCF (E¯,ξ ) denotes the expected payoff the firm receives if it accepts the con-
tract offered by the bank at the right endpoint.
Following the realisation of ξ , firms are able to reject the loan offer made to
them by the bank. If they reject the bank loan, firms are only able to produce if
E¯ ≥ K+ξ so that they have access to sufficient equity to fully finance the project.
Otherwise, firms receive an outside option that is normalised to zero. The outside
option of the firm therefore depends on the realisation of both E¯ and ξ . I assume
that the firm does not pay the transport cost if it does not receive a bank loan and so
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the firm’s outside option is independent of d and can be written as follows
u¯F (E¯,ξ ) =

max
{(
λ
η−1
)
−
(
K+ξ + ψ2 [K+ξ ]
2
)
,0
}
E¯ > K+ξ
0 Otherwise
(3.8)
Firms are more likely to accept a bank loan if they are located closer to a bank.
The total expected payoff from applying for a bank loan from the left bank is
ΠF (d, E¯) =∑
i
1
2
[ρB (ξi)max{uF (d, E¯,ξi) , u¯F (E¯,ξi)}+(1−ρB (ξi)) u¯F (E¯,ξi)]
(3.9)
Firm are distributed uniformly along the line and banks face symmetric prob-
lems, thus to simplify the exposition I will focus on the bank located at the left
endpoint.
The expected payoff the firm receives should they choose not to apply for a
bank loan depends on the value of E¯ relative to ξH and ξL as this will determine
after which realisations of ξ , if any, the firm is able to fund the project without a
bank loan. The total expected payoff the firm receives when choosing not to apply
for a bank loan is
U¯F (E¯)=

∑i 12 max
{(
λ
η−1
)
−K−ξi+ ψ2 [K+ξi]2 ,0
}
E¯ > K+ξH
max
{
1
2
[(
λ
η−1
)
−
(
K+ξL+ ψ2 [K+ξL]
2
)]
,0
}
K+ξL < E¯ ≤ K+ξH
0 Otherwise
(3.10)
Firms would prefer to apply for a loan from the left bank than not whenever
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ΠF (d, E¯) > U¯F (E¯). The value of not applying for a loan is independent of the
location of the firm d and thus ceteris paribus firms that are located further away
from a bank are less likely to apply for a bank loan. There are two possible reasons
why a firm may choose not to apply for a bank loan. First, if E¯ is low, they require
a large loan from the bank in order to produce, and the firm may anticipate that the
bank would not be willing to supply them with financing. These firms would choose
not to apply for a bank loan and would be unable to produce. This corresponds to
firms whose survey response was ’Did not apply because of possible rejection’.
The second possibility, is that E¯ is sufficiently high that firms find it is preferable to
finance the project solely through equity. This corresponds to the survey response
’Did not apply because of sufficient internal funds’.
Banks are risk neutral and have access to a perfectly elastic supply of de-
posits at a cost of 1+ r > 1. The expected profit of a bank providing a loan
(b(E¯,ξ ) ,R(E¯,ξ )) to a firm (d, E¯,ξ ) is simply the expected value of the promised
repayment less the cost of funds
Pr{Repay}R(E¯,ξ )b(E¯,ξ )− (1+ r)b(E¯,ξ )
Using equation (3.3) and the Pareto distribution for z defined by equation (3.1)
yields the following
piB (E¯,ξ ) =
(
1+
1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)−η
zˆ(E¯,ξ )− (1+ r)b(E¯,ξ ) (3.11)
While the bank is unable to condition the terms of the bank loan on d, the bank
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takes into account the impact of d on the likelihood that the firm accepts the terms
of their loan offer. As the mass of firms is uniformly distributed along d, from the
point of view of the left-hand bank, the probability of a firm that applies for a loan
with characteristics (E¯,ξ ) accepting a loan is
ρF (E¯,ξ ) =

1 if piF (E¯,ξ )−d∗ (E¯) t > u¯F (E¯,ξ )
0 if piF (E¯,ξ )< u¯F (E¯,ξ )
1
d∗(E¯)t [piF (E¯,ξ )− u¯F (E¯,ξ )] Otherwise
(3.12)
where d∗ (E¯) is the furthest distance from the bank that a firm is willing to apply
for a loan from the left-hand bank rather than the right-hand bank.3 Consider a
bank offering a set of contracts {b(E¯,ξi) ,R(E¯,ξi) ,ρB (E¯,ξi)}i∈{L,H} to a E¯ firm,
the total expected profit the bank would receive from this is
ΠB (E¯) =∑
i
1
2
[piB (E¯,ξi)ρB (E¯,ξi)ρF (E¯,ξi)] (3.13)
The timing of the model is as follows. First, firms observe their upper-bound
on equity issuance E¯ and their location from the banks d, and decide whether to
apply for a loan or not and if so, to which bank. Second, the value of fixed cost,
ξ , is publicly revealed and the bank makes its loan decision, by offering contract
terms (b(E¯,ξ ) ,R(E¯,ξ )) to the firm or rejecting the loan application with probabil-
3The firm chooses between three options, applying for a loan from the left bank, applying for a
loan from the right bank and not applying for a loan. As there is no cost to applying to a loan and in
order to simplify the contracting problem, I model the case of firms not applying for a loan as if they
had applied to the bank that offered them the best contracting terms and then rejected the contract
with probability one.
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ity ρB (E¯,ξ ). Third, the firm chooses whether to accept the loan terms, or to reject
the bank’s loan terms and take its outside option. Finally, the value of z is realised
and the firm chooses to repay or default on any loan it may have received.
3.3 Contracting Problem
Consider the problem faced by the bank located at the left endpoint when faced
with firms with equity cost parameter E¯. The bank must choose a set of contracts
{b(E¯,ξi) ,R(E¯,ξi) ,ρB (E¯,ξi)}i∈{L,H} that maximises the expected profit subject to
the participation constraints of the firm. The bank’s contracting problem can then
be written as
max
{b(E¯,ξi),R(E¯,ξi),ρB(E¯,ξi)}i∈{L,H}
ΠB (E¯)d∗ (E¯) (3.14)
subject to
∑
i
1
2
[uF (d∗ (E¯) , E¯,ξi)ρB (ξi)1{uF (d∗ (E¯) , E¯,ξi)> u¯F (E¯,ξi)}]≥
∑
i
1
2
[
uCF (d
∗ (E¯) , E¯,ξi)ρCB (ξi)1
{
uCF (d
∗ (E¯) , E¯,ξi)> u¯F (E¯,ξi)
}]
(3.15)
K+ξi ≤ b(E¯,ξi)+ e(E¯,ξi) ∀i ∈ {L,H} (3.16)
e(E¯,ξi)≤ E¯ ∀i ∈ {L,H} (3.17)
0≤ ρB (E¯,ξi)≤ 1 ∀i ∈ {L,H} (3.18)
There are two participation constraints that are relevant for the bank’s prob-
lem. First, firms may choose to reject a contract offered to them and instead receive
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their outside option set out by equation (3.8). Second, firms could choose to apply
to the competing bank. Firms closer to the left bank with d ∈ [0, 12) will have a
natural preference to apply to the left bank, but if the bank offered better contract
terms than its competitor, it would be able to capture a larger share of the loan ap-
plications. This second participation constraint is set out by equation (3.15), which
determines the share of loan applications made to the left bank, d∗ (E¯). Equation
(3.16), equation (3.17) and equation (3.18) are feasibility constraints.
Conditional on the realisation of ξ , one of the two participation constraints
will be relevant to the problem, either the firm will reject the loan offer with some
positive probability as determined by equation (3.8), or the firm will accept the loan
offer with probability one and competition from the other bank will be relevant.
There are three possible cases to consider. The first, that of full-scale competition4
occurs in which case ρF (E¯,ξL) = ρF (E¯,ξH) = 1 and firms will accept the loan
offered regardless of their distance from the bank. The second case, is that of local
monopoly where ρF (E¯,ξL) < 1 and ρF (E¯,ξH) < 1. In this case, the presence of
the competing bank does not impact the contracts offered and both banks will act
as a local monopolist to firms located sufficiently close to them, while firms located
away from the banks, around d = 12 , will choose not apply for a loan. The third
case, is the mixed case where neither of the above two cases holds. Which of these
cases holds depends on E¯ and t.
Finally, as both the left and the right bank face symmetric problems, in equi-
librium both banks offer the same set of contracts to firms located at each end of the
4The terms that describe the cases here are commonly used in Spatial competition models such
as Stole (1995) and in Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999).
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line and thus in equilibrium d∗ (E¯) = 12 .
3.3.1 Equilibrium Loan Size
Before analysing the three cases set out above, I first analyse the part of the solution
that is common to all three, namely the equilibrium loan size. From the first order
conditions from the bank’s constrained optimisation problem, if the upper-bound on
equity does not bind, the equilibrium contract occurs at the point where the firm’s
marginal rate of substitution between the loan size b(E¯,ξ ) and the interest rate
R(E¯,ξ ) equals that of the bank. It follows from the convexity of the equity cost
function that the following inequality must hold in equilibrium
(1+ψ · e(E¯,ξ ))
(
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
≤ 1+ r (3.19)
Equation (3.19) holds with equality whenever e(E¯,ξ ) < E¯ and can be rear-
ranged to yield the following equation for e(E¯,ξ ) in terms of the default cutoff
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
e(E¯,ξ ) =
1
ψ
[
(1+ r)
(
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
−1
]
(3.20)
Using equation (3.4) yields an equation for b(E¯,ξ ) in terms of the default
cutoff zˆ(E¯,ξ )
b(E¯,ξ ) = K+ξ +
1
ψ
−
(
1+ r
ψ
)(
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
(3.21)
A requirement for the firm with e(E¯,ξ )< E¯ to want to borrow a positive quan-
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tity of debt is
1+ r < 1+ψ (K+ξ ) (3.22)
This requires the marginal cost of financing the entire project through equity to be
less than the risk free interest rate that the bank must pay on its deposits. I assume
that equation (3.22) is satisfied at both ξL and ξH so that the optimal loan contract
features a positive quantity of debt.
If on the other hand the upper-bound on equity binds such that e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯,
equation (3.19) holds as a strict inequality and the loan size can be found from the
firm’s budget constraint, equation (3.4) as
b(E¯,ξ ) = K+ξ − E¯ (3.23)
Whether the upper-bound on equity holds in equilibrium or not depends not only
on how tight the constraint on equity issuance is, E¯, but also on the default prob-
ability. From the derivative of equation (3.20) with respect to zˆ(E¯,ξ ) it follows
that contracts with higher default probability are more likely to result in the equity
constraint binding.
As both the equilibrium equity issuance e(E¯,ξ ) and the loan size b(E¯,ξ ) have
been found in terms of the default probability, zˆ(E¯,ξ ), the equilibrium loan contract
can now be fully summarised by the default probability. The impact of a change in
the default probability on the equity issuance and loan size is set out in the proposi-
tion below.
Proposition 3.1. If e(E¯,ξ )< E¯, equity issued in the equilibrium contract is strictly
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increasing in the default probability of the contract ∂e(E¯,ξ )∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) > 0 and the debt issued
in the equilibrium contract is strictly increasing in the default probability ∂b(E¯,ξ )∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) <
0. If e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯, ∂e(E¯,ξ )∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = 0 and
∂b(E¯,ξ )
∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = 0.
Proof. When the upper-bound on equity is slack, e(E¯,ξ ) < E¯, the first part of the
proposition follows directly from differentiating equation (3.20) and equation (3.21)
with respect to the default cutoff. When the upper-bound on equity binds, e(E¯,ξ ) =
E¯, the second part of the proposition follows immediately from e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯ and
equation (3.23).
Proposition 3.1 shows that as the default probability of the contract increases,
the firms would prefer to raise additional equity finance and reduce the size of the
loan they obtain from the bank. When the upper-bound on equity binds, the firm is
no longer able to reduce the loan size and the equity and debt levels do not respond
to an increase in the default probability of the bank loan.
The likelihood of firms applying for a loan and subsequently accepting a loan
offer is determined by the profit they obtain from the loan contract. The link be-
tween the default probability and the firm profit of a loan contract is set out in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The profit a firm obtains from a given loan contract, piF (E¯,ξ ), is
strictly decreasing in the default probability of a loan contract, zˆ(E¯,ξ ) and hence
both ρF (E¯,ξ ) and ΠF (d, E¯) are weakly decreasing in zˆ(E¯,ξ ).
Proof. By substituting equation (3.20) into the definition of piF (E¯,ξ ) and differen-
tiating yields ∂piF (E¯,ξ )∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) < 0. The rest of the proposition follows from the definition
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of ρF (E¯,ξ ), equation (3.12), and ΠF (d, E¯), equation (3.9).
Proposition 3.2 shows that in cases where the default probability zˆ(E¯,ξ ) is
higher, firms are less likely to apply for loans and less likely to accept a loan offer
should they apply.
Proposition 3.3. If e(E¯,ξ ) < E¯ then the profit a bank receives from a contract,
piB (E¯,ξ ), is increasing for all equilibrium contracts with b(E¯,ξ )> 0. Otherwise if
e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯, the profit a bank receives from a contract, piB (E¯,ξ ), is increasing for
zˆ(E¯,ξ ) ∈
[
0, λη−1
]
and decreasing at zˆ(E¯,ξ )> λη−1 .
Proof. The second part of the proposition follows from substituting in equation
(3.23) into the definition of bank profit, equation (3.11), and differentiating. The
derivative is increasing for zˆ(E¯,ξ )< λη−1 and has a unique maximum at zˆ(E¯,ξ ) =
λ
η−1 . The first part of the proposition follows from noting that equation (3.21) and
b(E¯,ξ )> 0 implies zˆ(E¯,ξ )< λη−1 . Then from equation (3.21) and equation (3.11),
the derivative of piB (E¯,ξ ) with respect to zˆ(E¯,ξ ) is positive for zˆ(E¯,ξ )< λη−1 .
From the above proposition, there is a unique default probability that max-
imises the bank profit from the contract, piB (E¯,ξ ), which occurs at zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = λη−1 .
This default probability can only occur when the upper-bound of equity binds. Oth-
erwise, firms will substitute away from bank debt and increase their equity issuance
as the default probability approaches this level.
3.3.2 Full-Scale Competition
I now turn to the case of full-scale competition. When this case holds, all firms apply
for loans and will accept the bank’s loan offer so that ρF (E¯,ξL) = ρF (E¯,ξH) =
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1. The first order conditions of the bank’s problem yields, in addition to equation
(3.19) discussed above, the following equation
ΠB (E¯) =
t
2
(
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
(3.24)
The above equation links the expected default probability of a contract zˆ(E¯,ξ )
to the total expected profit of the bank. This must hold for both ξL and ξH and
thus the default probability remains constant regardless of the realisation of ξ , and
zˆ(E¯,ξL) = zˆ(E¯,ξH). Using the definition for ΠB (E¯) set out in equation (3.13)
yields a system of equations along with equation (3.19) which pins down the de-
fault probabilities.
While there does not exist a closed form solution for zˆ(E¯,ξ ), the properties of
the equilibrium can be found using the implicit function theorem. I will focus on the
impact of a change in the parameter t, which governs the market power of banks and
hence the level of competition on the banking sector. An increase in t will decrease
competition in the banking sector. The relationship between t and zˆ(E¯,ξ ) is set out
in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.4. When a full-scale equilibrium occurs and ρF (E¯,ξL) =
ρF (E¯,ξH) = 1, an increase in t increases the default probability on loans zˆ(E¯,ξ )
for all zˆ(E¯,ξ ) ∈
[
0, λη−1
]
. Furthermore, if zˆ(E¯,ξ )> λη−1 the bank would make an
expected loss by offering the loan contracts and instead rejects the loan application
with probability one.
Proof. In a full-scale equilibrium, the relationship between t and zˆ(E¯,ξ ) is given by
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equation (3.24). From equation (3.13), the derivative ofΠB (E¯) is positive whenever
zˆ(E¯,ξ )≤ λη−1 and by applying the implicit-function theorem to equation (3.24) the
first part of the proposition immediately follows. From equation (3.24) it follows
that zˆ(E¯,ξ )≤ λη−1 is a necessary condition for the bank to earn a positive expected
profit on the set of contracts, ΠB (E¯) > 0, and the second part of the proposition
immediately follows.
The last contract term to consider is ρB (E¯,ξ ), the probability that the bank
rejects a firm’s loan application. As discussed in proposition 3.4, if the bank makes
an expected loss from offering the set of loan contracts, banks will always reject
the loan applications, setting ρB (E¯,ξ ) = 0. Furthermore, it follows from the bank’s
first order conditions that following the realisation of ξ , the bank will always accept
the loan application, ρB (E¯,ξ ) = 1, whenever piB (E¯,ξ ) ≥ 0. Intuitively, a profit
maximising bank would never reject a profitable loan application.
If piB (E¯,ξi)< 0 for some i ∈ {L,H} and ΠB (E¯)> 0, the bank may choose to
reject the loan application with some probability ρB (E¯,ξi) ∈ (0,1). This is set out
formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.5. When a full-scale equilibrium occurs and i) piB (E¯,ξi) < 0, ii)
piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
> 0 for some i, j ∈ {L,H} and j 6= i, and iii) the following condition is
met
− t
2
piB (E¯,ξi)< piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t
2
)
(3.25)
the bank will reject loan applications following the realisation of ξi with a proba-
bility ρB (E¯,ξi) ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, the default probability will be given by the
3.3. Contracting Problem 82
following equation
ρB (E¯,ξi) =−
piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
piB (E¯,ξi)
(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t2
piF (E¯,ξi)− t2
)
−
t
2(
piF (E¯,ξi)− t2
) (3.26)
In the case where
− t
2
piB (E¯,ξi)≥ piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t
2
)
(3.27)
the bank rejects the loan application following the realisation of ξi with probability
one and ρB (E¯,ξi) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.
Proposition 3.5 raises the possibility that banks use cross-subsidisation across
states, along with random loan rejections to incentivise firms to apply for loans,
while limiting the losses they make following the realisation of ξi. This occurs
because firms compete for loan applications rather than on individual contracts.
Banks make a positive profit if the realised cost is ξ j and are willing to make a loss
in the case where the realised cost is ξi in order to satisfy the participation constraint
of the firms and encourage additional loan applications.
The full-scale competition equilibrium occurs if the firms located at the mid-
point of the line apply for a loan and accept the loan terms regardless of the realisa-
tion of ξ . This implies that the following must hold for both i ∈ {L,H}
t
2
≤ piF (E¯,ξ )− u¯F (E¯,ξ ) (3.28)
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The right hand side of equation (3.28) is decreasing in zˆ(E¯,ξ ) and hence de-
creasing in t when the full-scale competition equilibrium occurs. It follows that an
increase in t, and hence a decrease in competition in the banking sector, means it is
less likely that the firms located at the mid-point will apply for and accept a bank
loan and that the full-scale competition equilibrium will occur only if competition
in the banking sector is high and t is sufficiently low. Another implication of equa-
tion (3.28) is that all firms will apply for a loan, either to the left bank if they are
located at d ∈ [0, 12) or to the right bank otherwise.
3.3.3 Local Monopoly
I now turn to the equilibrium case at the other end of the spectrum, which is the
case of local monopoly. In this case, firms that are located sufficiently far from the
banks choose not to apply for a bank and ρF (E¯,ξi) ∈ (0,1) ∀i ∈ {L,H}. The first
order conditions of the bank’s problem can then be written as
piB (E¯,ξ ) =
(
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
[piF (E¯,ξ )− u¯F (E¯,ξ )] (3.29)
This equation holds for both ξL and ξH . However, unlike in the full-scale competi-
tion case discussed above, the default probability is able to vary depending on the
realisation of ξ .
As before, no closed form solution can be found but the properties of the equi-
librium default probability zˆ(E¯,ξ ) can be found by applying the implicit function
theorem to equation (3.29). Another important difference in the local monopoly
case is that, so long as the local monopoly remains, the level of competition in the
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banking sector as governed by t, no longer impacts the equilibrium default proba-
bilities offered to firms. This is evidenced by the fact that both equation (3.19) and
equation (3.29) are independent of t.
Turning now to the probability of the probability that the bank reject a firm’s
loan application, the first order condition for the bank’s problem yields the following
condition
ρB (E¯,ξ ) =

1 if piB (E¯,ξ )≥ 0
0 otherwise
(3.30)
In the local monopoly case, each bank has full monopoly power over the firms that
choose to apply to them and there is no need for the bank to cross-subsidise across
the two realisations of ξ . Instead banks only offer contracts to firms if they are
profitable.
The local monopoly equilibrium occurs if firms located at the mid-point of the
line do not apply for a loan. This implies that the following must hold for both
i ∈ {L,H}
t
2
> piF (E¯,ξ )− u¯F (E¯,ξ ) (3.31)
This holds if t is sufficiently large. When the above equation is satisfied, firms that
are located sufficiently far from the two banks, with d close to 12 , choose not to apply
to either bank for a loan as they anticipate that the bank will not be able to offer them
a loan contract which provides them with a higher payoff than their outside option.
Whether or not these firms invest in the project depends on E¯ relative to the cost of
investment and whether they are able to profitably fund the project through equity
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alone.
3.3.4 Mixed case
In the mixed case equilibrium, all firms will apply to a bank regardless of their
distance from them. Following one realisation of the fixed cost, ξi, all firms will
accept the bank contract and ρF (E¯,ξi) = 1 while following the other realisation
ξ j j 6= i, firms that are located furthest away from the banks will reject the loan
offer and ρF
(
E¯,ξ j
)
< 1. The firm faces a local monopoly contract following the
realisation of ξ j and a full-competition contract following the realisation of ξi.
The contract offered to the firm following a realisation of ξ j is identical to the
local monopoly case and zˆ
(
E¯,ξ j
)
is determined by equation (3.29) and as such is
determined independently of t. In the case of ρF (E¯,ξi) = 1, the first order condi-
tions of the bank’s problem yields the following equation which determines zˆ(E¯,ξi)
piB (E¯,ξi) =
t
2
(
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξi)
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξi)
)
(3.32)
Applying the implicit function theorem applied to equation (3.32), it follows
that the derivative of zˆ(E¯,ξi) with respect to t is positive and thus the default prob-
ability associated with the loan contract increases as the market power of the banks
increase. The key difference between the mixed and full-scale competition cases is
that equation (3.32) no longer contains the expected bank profit but rather the bank
profit conditional on ξi. As a result, zˆ(E¯,ξi) is determined independently of the
contract offered following the realisation of ξ j and there is no cross-subsidisation
between states. The bank rejects the firm’s loan application with probability one
3.3. Contracting Problem 86
if it were to make a loss on the loan, and accepts it with probability one if it were
to make a profit, thus the policy for ρB (E¯,ξ ) is the same as in the local monopoly
case, set out in equation (3.30).
The mixed case equilibrium occurs if all firms apply for a loan but the firms
located at the mid-point of the line will reject the loan offer following the realisation
of ξi while accepting the loan offer following the realisation of ξ j. This implies that
the following must hold
t
2
≤ piF (E¯,ξi)− u¯F (E¯,ξi) (3.33)
t
2
> piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− u¯F (E¯,ξ j) (3.34)
The mixed case will occur when t takes an intermediate value, higher than the value
required by the full-competition case but lower than the value that would lead to the
local monopoly case. In the mixed case, all firms apply for a loan irrespective of
the distance from the bank as they all have a positive probability of ξi being realised
and accepting the loan offer.
While it may be tempting to think j may only take one specific value, this is
not the case. There are two reasons a firm may reject a bank loan offer. A firm
may prefer not to produce rather than accept the loan terms, in which case it is
more likely that ξ j = ξH as the higher fixed cost will lead to worse lending terms.
However, it may be that the firm prefers to finance the project through equity only,
rather than accept the loan terms and this is more likely when ξ j = ξL.
Market power in the banking sector, t, affects the type of equilibrium in the
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contract market. From equation (3.28), the full-scale competition case occurs when
the firms have low market power and t is low. Similarly, from equation (3.31), the
local monopoly case occurs when firms have high market power and t is high and
the mixed case occurs at intermediate values of t as can be seen from equation (3.33)
and equation (3.34).
3.4 Credit Rationing
In their discussion of credit rationing, Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) set out several def-
initions of credit rationing. In this section, I focus on three of their definitions and
link them to the questionnaire responses in the ECB SAFE survey. I then show how
they relate to the properties of the model and how a change in the market power in
the banking sector impacts the possibility of credit rationing.
The first type of credit rationing that I focus on is that of ’redlining’ which
Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) describe as the case where a lender refuses to grant credit
to a borrower at any interest rate. The second type of credit rationing they refer to
as ’pure credit rationing’ which occurs when some individuals obtain loans while
apparently identical individuals are unable to receive the same loan terms. Both of
these types of credit rationing correspond to firms in the survey that applied for a
loan and were rejected. The survey does not distinguish between these two types
of credit rationing. In the model, the bank rejects a firm conditional on E¯ and
the realisation of ξ with probability ρB (E¯,ξ ). The ’redlining’ definition of credit
rationing corresponds to ρB (E¯,ξ ) = 0 while the ’pure credit rationing’ definition
corresponds to ρB (E¯,ξ ) ∈ (0,1).
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The possibility of ’redlining’ in the full-scale competition case is covered by
proposition 3.5. In the local monopoly or mixed equilibrium cases, the possibility
of redlining is set out in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.6. In a local monopoly or mixed equilibrium, a bank makes a loss on
a potential loan contract, piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0, if and only if e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯ and zˆ(E¯,ξ ) >
λ
η−1 . A necessary condition required for piB (E¯,ξ )< 0 is
(
1+
1
η−1
)−η( λ
η−1
)
< (1+ r)(K+ξ − E¯) (3.35)
The bank will reject loan contracts with probability one conditional on the realisa-
tion of ξ and ρB (E¯,ξ ) = 0.
Proof. Equation (3.29) in the local monopoly case and equation (3.32) in the mixed
case, a necessary condition for piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0 is that zˆ(E¯,ξ ) > λη−1 . From propo-
sition 3.3, if e(E¯,ξ ) < E¯ then zˆ(E¯,ξ ) < λη−1 and piB (E¯,ξ ) > 0 and the first
part of the proposition follows. In addition, proposition 3.3 states the bank max-
imises profit at zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = λη−1 . A necessary condition for piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0 is that
piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0 at zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = λη−1 and e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯. From equation (3.23) this im-
plies
(
1+ 1η−1
)−η ( λ
η−1
)
< (1+ r)(K+ξ − E¯). The final part of the proposition
follows from the bank’s first order condition with respect to ρB (E¯,ξ ).
The proposition above sets out when ’redlining’ occurs. The bank profit
equation is increasing in the default probability zˆ(E¯,ξ ) up to the point where
zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = λη−1 . In both the local monopoly case and the mixed case, redlining
only occurs when piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0 and zˆ(E¯,ξ ) > λη−1 . This can only occur when
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e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯. Intuitively, banks that make negative profit on a contract are able to
raise the default probability and hence the profit they make up to the maximum point
zˆ(E¯,ξ ) = λη−1 and will do so either until they are able to make a positive profit, or
the firm is no longer willing to accept the loan offer. As the default probability and
the interest rate charged to the firm increases, the firm would only be willing to
accept the loan offer when the upper-bound on the amount of equity the firm is able
to issue binds and the firm is unable to produce without a bank loan.
The requirements for piB (E¯,ξ ) < 0 set out in proposition 3.6 are independent
of t and thus in both the local monopoly case and the mixed case, an increase in
market power will not affect which loan applicants will be unable to obtain a bank
loan. However, an increase in t will reduce the number of firms that apply for loans
due to the fall in piF (E¯,ξ ). The proportion of loan applicants being ’redlined’ will
only increase with t if the increase in the number of firms that don’t apply and
self-finance more than offsets the firms that switch between being redlined and not
applying, fearing rejection.
The case of ’redlining’ in the full-scale competition case is complicated by
the possibility of ’pure credit rationing’ occurring. The ’pure credit rationing’ case
leads to fewer firms being rejected than if they had simply been ’redlined’ while the
bank makes a negative profit on contracts in this situation. An increase in market
power in the banking sector, t, makes it less likely that the full-scale competition
equilibria occurs and hence less likely ’pure credit rationing’ occurs.
The third form of credit rationing I consider is ’price rationing’ which Jaffee
and Stiglitz (1990) describe as the situation where a borrower receives a loan of a
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smaller size than desired at a given loan rate. This corresponds to firms in the survey
that applied for a loan and were accepted but did not receive the full loan amount
they had requested. To consider this form of credit rationing, note that the partial
derivative of piF (E¯,ξ ) with respect to the loan size is
∂piF (E¯,ξ )
∂b(E¯,ξ )
= 1+ψ · e(E¯,ξ )− [1−G(zˆ(E¯,ξ ))]R(E¯,ξ ) (3.36)
The above derivative captures the firm’s loan demand at a fixed interest rate
R(E¯,ξ ).Firms are price rationed if, at the equilibrium contract, equation (3.36) is
positive as they would rather have a larger loan at the given interest rate. If equation
(3.36) is negative, the firm would prefer to finance their project with less debt and
are not price rationed.
The impact of t on the likelihood of ’price rationing’ is detailed in the propo-
sition below.
Proposition 3.7. If e(E¯,ξ ) = E¯, then d{∂piF (E¯,ξ )/∂b(E¯,ξ )}dt < 0 and firms are less
likely to be price-rationed when t increases. If e(E¯,ξ ) < E¯, a sufficient condition
for d{∂piF (E¯,ξ )/∂b(E¯,ξ )}dt < 0 and thus for firms to be less likely to be price rationed
following an increase in t is
(
1
1+ r
)
(1+ψ (K+ξ ))< 2 (3.37)
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2.
In the case where the equity constraint binds, an increase in t will decrease
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equation (3.36) and make it less likely that firms are credit constrained. Firms
are least likely to be price rationed when E¯ is close to, but less than the required
investment level K+ξ . Intuitively, these firms are unable to self-finance the project
but require only a small bank loan in order to finance the project, which they may
be willing to pay a relatively large interest rate on. These firms would not be price
rationed because, given the interest rate charged on their loan, they would prefer to
increase the equity they issue and obtain a smaller loan but are unable to do so due
to the binding constraint on equity.
In the case where the equity constraint does not bind, (3.36) is only decreasing
in t if the cost of equity is not too high relative to the cost of deposits. However,
even if this condition is satisfied, firms are more likely to be price rationed when
e(E¯,ξ )< E¯. This is because for a firm not to be price rationed, the loan size b(E¯,ξ )
must be sufficiently small and the interest rate charged R(E¯,ξ ) must be sufficiently
high that equation (3.36) is negative. However, if this were the case, the firm would
be better off attempting to fully self-finance the project and not having to pay the
high interest rate charged by the bank.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to analyse SME loan applications. In particular it
is able to capture key features of responses to the ’Survey on the access to finance
of enterprises’. Firms that can self-finance a project may choose not to apply for a
bank loan while still being able to produce. The model is able to distinguish this
case from cases where a firm does not apply for a loan because they anticipate their
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application will be rejected with certainty.
The model also allows for different types of credit rationing. Firms can have
their application accepted but be price rationed, where the firm would want a larger
loan at the quoted interest rate, or they could see their application rejected outright
by the bank. As in the data, firms may also reject a loan offer made by the bank.
The impact of competition also fits with some of the observed properties of
the data. First, the proportion of firms applying for bank loans appears lower in
countries that have less competition in the banking sector, as measured by the HHI
of total assets in the banking sector. This feature also holds in the model, where
a decrease in in the banking sector leads to more firms choosing to self-finance
and fewer firms finding it profitable to apply for a bank loan regardless of whether
they produce or not. Second, the proportion of firms that find their loan accepted
appears lower in countries that have less competition in the banking sector. Here,
the implications of the model are less clear cut, however, this result may hold in
cases where, in response to an increase in the market power of the banking sector
t, the increase in the proportion of firms that choose not to apply a bank loan and
self-finance is larger than the proportion of firms that switch from being ’redlined’
to not applying because they anticipate being rejected with probability one.
The framework presented here suggests that competition in the banking sector
is a key determinant of both the applications and outcomes of SME loans, however
it is not the only determining factor and further research should be undertaken to
understand the relative importance of competition in the banking sector versus other
factors such as aggregate shocks.
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3.7 Appendix for Chapter 3
3.7.1 Proof of proposition 3.5
First note that for a bank to be willing to loan to a firm, it must be the case that
Π(E¯) > 0 and thus piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
> 0 for j ∈ {L,H}. Also note that piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
> 0
implies ρB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
= 1.
From the first order condition for the bank’s problem with respect to ρB (E¯,ξi),
the following must hold for an interior solution to ρB (E¯,ξi)
1
2
piB (E¯,ξi)+
1
t
piB (E¯,ξi)ρB (E¯,ξi)
(
piF (E¯,ξi)− t2
)
+
1
t
piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t
2
)
= 0
(3.38)
For there to be a solution to the above equation, it must be the case that piB (E¯,ξi)< 0
and
− t
2
piB (E¯,ξi)< piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t
2
)
(3.39)
Then the rejection probability can be found as
ρB (E¯,ξi) =−
piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)
piB (E¯,ξi)
(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t2
piF (E¯,ξi)− t2
)
−
t
2
piF (E¯,ξi)− t2
(3.40)
In the case where
− t
2
piB (E¯,ξi)≥ piB
(
E¯,ξ j
)(
piF
(
E¯,ξ j
)− t
2
)
(3.41)
the bank rejects the loan application with probability one following the realisation
of ξi and ρB (E¯,ξi) = 0.
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3.7.2 Proof of proposition 3.7
If the equity constraint binds, equation (3.36) can be written as
ι =
(1+ψE¯)(K+ξ − E¯)− (1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ ))−η zˆ(E¯,ξ )
K+ξ − E¯ (3.42)
The first part of the proposition follows immediately from differentiation the above
with respect to zˆ(E¯,ξ ) getting ∂ ι∂ zˆ(E¯,ξ ) < 0 and noting that
dzˆ(E¯,ξ )
dt ≥ 0.
For the second part of the proposition, first note that if the equity constraint
does not bind, equation (3.36) can be written as
ι =
1
ψ
(
(1+ r)2
b(E¯,ξ )
)(
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
ψ
(
1
1+ r
)(
K+ξ +
1
ψ
)
− 1
ψ
(
(1+ r)2
b(E¯,ξ )
)(
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)
− 1
ψ
(
(1+ r)2
b(E¯,ξ )
)
ψ
λ
(
1
1+ r
)2(
1+
1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)−η 1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
(3.43)
The derivative of this with respect to zˆ(E¯,ξ ) is
∂ ι
∂ zˆ
=− 1
λ
[
η
[
2
(
1+ 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)− ( 11+r)(1+ψ (K+ξ ))(1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ ))](
1− (η−1) 1λ zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)3
]
− 1
λ
[
ψ
λ
(
1
1+ r
)2(
1− (η−1) 1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)(
1+
1
λ
zˆ(E¯,ξ )
)−η−1]
(3.44)
A sufficient condition for the above derivative to be negative is
(
1
1+ r
)
(1+ψ (K+ξ ))< 2 (3.45)
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and the second part of the proposition immediately follows.
Chapter 4
Macroeconomic implications of
insolvency regimes
4.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis output in both the UK and the
US fell considerably. Real GDP fell by 5.88 percent in the UK between 2007Q4-
2009Q2 while real GDP fell by 4.24 percent in the US over the same period. De-
spite UK output falling further than in the US, the UK labour market remained
surprisingly resilient, as employment fell by 1.65 percent between 2007Q4-2009Q2
compared to the US where employment decreased by 5.34 percent. The key driver
of the fall in UK output was labour productivity, which fell 3.3 percent. In the US,
labour productivity actually increased by 2.3 percent.1
This paper suggests a link between labour productivity and a country’s insol-
1UK data is from the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS), US GDP data is from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US productivity and unemployment data from the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). Labour productivity for the UK is measured as output per hour worked
for the whole economy. Labour productivity for the US is output per hour worked for the non-farm
business sector.
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vency regime. It is well documented, for example by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh and
Schleifer (2008), that the UK insolvency regime is more creditor-friendly than in
other countries, including the US. The UK insolvency regime features two main
procedures, administration and liquidation. The stated aim of administration is to
maintain the firm as a going concern and is similar in principle to the US Chapter 11
procedure. One key difference between the UK and US insolvency regimes is in the
control firm ownership maintains once insolvency begins. In the US, Chapter 11 al-
lows firm management to remain in place and a court arbitrates between debtor and
creditor. In the UK, administration replaces management with a professional ’in-
solvency practitioner’ or ’administrator’. The administrator has full control of the
business during administration. Liquidation on the other hand is a simple winding-
up process, similar to the US Chapter 7 procedure where the firm ceases trading and
the assets of the firm are sold off in an attempt to satisfy creditors. The incentives
of firm management to default on its debt will depend on the insolvency regime in
place and may impact on the firm’s production decisions through the interest rate
on firm debt.
I model the UK insolvency regime using a firm dynamics model in the spirit of
Hopenhayn (1992) with the addition of financial frictions. Firms have access to both
equity and debt. Equity is subject to exogenous issuance costs as in Gomes (2001)
while debt is modeled using the costly-state verification framework of Townsend
(1979). I allow for the firm to endogenously choose between two insolvency pro-
cedures. The first, restructuring, like administration in the UK and Chapter 11 in
the US, allows the firm to continue subject to agreement between the parties. The
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second, liquidation, as in the UK and the US through Chapter 7, involves firm exit.
If the firm chooses to restructure its debt, the firm and lender must bargain over the
proceeds from restructuring. I distinguish between a creditor-friendly regime such
as the UK and a debtor-friendly regime such as the US through the firm’s bargaining
power during restructuring. Defaulting is costly and leads to a loss of efficiency. In
particular, the cost of holding capital increases for high-risk firms. In the model, I
find that more borrowing constrained firms have a lower capital-to-labour ratio and
thus have lower labour productivity.
I calibrate this model to UK aggregate data and find that the creditor-friendly
bankruptcy regime features better steady-state properties, with higher output and
higher labour productivity. This result is driven by banks charging lower interest
rates on debt in the creditor-friendly regime which in turn implies lower barriers to
entry for firms and higher employment in the steady state. In order to explore the
dynamics of the model, I analyse an unanticipated aggregate productivity shock.
The model finds a response to shocks that are largely consistent with the UK and
the US following the financial crisis. Specifically, employment falls most in the
debtor-friendly regime while labour productivity falls more in the creditor-friendly
regime. A debtor-friendly insolvency regime, while more costly in the steady-state
allows firms to remain less borrowing constrained following an aggregate shock
and as a consequence these firms hold more capital relative to their counterparts in
a creditor-friendly regime.
In order to further establish the link between firm behaviour and labour pro-
ductivity since the financial crisis, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the change in the
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number of firms, employment by these firms and the ratio of employment to num-
ber of firms for the UK and US respectively. The key takeaway from these graphs
is that following the financial crisis, the number of firms in the UK fell more, in
percentage terms than employment. This results in a higher employment per firm,
which is a crude measure of the average firm size. In the US this result is reversed,
employment fell more than the number of firms and the average firm size fell. I
consider two possible explanations for this behaviour. First, that the firms that ex-
ited the economy in the US tended to be larger compared to the UK. This would
cause the average size of the firms remaining to fall. A second explanation is that
continuing firms in the US reduced their employment to a much greater extent than
in the UK, that is firms adjusted the intensive margin of employment more in the US
than in the UK. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4 I examine whether these differences derive
from selection effects, exit of larger firms in the US relative to the UK, or from ad-
justment of employment at the intensive margin. I find that the size of exiting firms
increased marginally in both the UK and the US between 2008 and 2014. This sug-
gests that the differences in employment are driven by incumbent firms adjusting
their workforce. This paper presents a possible mechanism through which this can
occur, driven by differences between the bankruptcy regimes in the UK and US.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the large literature that explores the interaction between
financial frictions and firm dynamics. The firm dynamics build on Hopenhayn
(1992), where firms are heterogeneous, face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and
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Figure 4.1: UK employment per firm since the financial crisis
Index of the total number of firms, total employment associated with those firms
and the average employment per firm, 2008=100.
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 4.2: US employment per firm since the financial crisis
Index of the total number of firms, total employment associated with those firms
and the average employment per firm, 2008=100.
Source: Business Dynamic Statistics.
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Figure 4.3: Size of UK firm exits since the financial crisis
Index of the total number of firm deaths, total employment associated with exiting
firms and the average employment per firm, 2008=100.
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 4.4: Size of US firm exits since the financial crisis
Index of the total number of firm deaths, total employment associated with exiting
firms and the average employment per firm, 2008=100.
Source: Business Dynamic Statistics.
4.1. Introduction 104
pay fixed costs to both enter and to continue production. Entry in this paper follows
that of Clementi and Palazzo (2016); the mass of potential entrants is fixed and the
free entry condition pins down the productivity of the marginal entrant. With the
potential number of entrants fixed, the wage is sensitive to fluctuations in employ-
ment and allows for non-trivial transition dynamics in a model with no aggregate
uncertainty. The addition of financial frictions to heterogeneous firm models has
been explored by Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Covas and Den Haan (2012), and
Clementi and Palazzo (2016).
This paper is related to the literature of credit markets. Specifically, it is re-
lated to models of debt such as the costly-state verification framework proposed by
Townsend (1979) and featured in the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carl-
strom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and others. Addi-
tionally, it is related to models of exogenous equity finance such as Gomes (2001),
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Covas and Den Haan (2012). Papers on debt in-
solvency are less numerous, however Corbae and D’Erasmo (2017) also study the
choice between restructuring and liquidation in the context of a heterogeneous firms
model, focusing on the US system of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. The main differ-
ence between this paper and theirs is the treatment of the labour market. They
assume a fixed supply of inelastically supplied labour and model firm entry as in
Hopenhayn (1992) where the free-entry condition pins down the equilibrium wage.
This rules out the possibility of aggregate employment dynamics as without aggre-
gate shocks, the wage remains constant and entry adjusts to clear the market. In my
paper, I extend the existing literature on insolvency by assuming that households
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supply labour elastically and the mass of potential entrants is held fixed. This al-
lows for fluctuations in both the wage and employment in response to unanticipated
aggregate shocks. Another paper investigating the implications of creditor rights in
insolvency on firm behaviour is Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2011) who study a
model featuring two insolvency regimes, an ’equity-friendly system’ as in the US
and a ’debt-friendly-system’ as in the UK and find that the insolvency regime im-
pacts the leverage ratio. In related work, Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2011) study
empirically the difference in insolvency regimes across countries and find having
strong creditor rights in a country leads firms to reduce risk and become more re-
luctant to borrow.
This paper is also related to the literature on labour productivity, especially on
the literature that focuses on the UK ’productivity puzzle’. Blundell, Crawford and
Jin (2014) set out the empirical evidence underlying the ’productivity puzzle’ and
explore some of the possible causes behind it. This paper is not meant to provide
a theory of the UK’s low productivity, but rather to highlight the UK’s insolvency
regime as a possible contributing factor and to investigate the extent to which this
is the case.
4.2 Model
Consider a discrete time general equilibrium model with a representative household
and heterogeneous firms facing financial frictions. Firms are owned by households
and produce a homogeneous good using two inputs; capital (k) and labour (n). Firms
fund their costs of production through internal funds and two sources of external
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funding: equity (e) and debt (b). Issuing equity is subject to an external issuance
cost while debt finance occurs through a one-period contract with competitive risk-
neutral financial intermediaries. Debt is risky and firms can default on their debt.
A firm that defaults on its debt faces an endogenous choice between two forms of
insolvency; debt restructuring and liquidation. A firm that enters liquidation ceases
trading and is forced to exit, firms receive nothing and financial intermediaries re-
ceive the revenue of the firm less a liquidation cost. A firm that restructures its debt
remains in the market and is able to produce in the following period. The payoffs
following a restructuring is the result of bargaining between the firm and the bank.
There is a representative household that maximises lifetime utility. Household in-
come is derived from labour income, asset holdings, and dividends from firms.
4.2.1 Firms
Firms enter the period with net worth (x). The inputs of capital (k) and labour (n)
are decided one period in advance. At the beginning of the period the firm’s revenue
for the period is realised. Following the realisation of their revenue, firms decide
whether or not to default on their debt and if a firm defaults, it chooses whether
to enter insolvency or liquidation. Next, firms issue equity (e) or dividends and
choose whether to produce in the following period. Finally, firms that choose to
produce next period choose next period’s capital (k′), labour (n′) and the terms of
debt financing (b′,R′) for the next period. With R′ the interest rate charged by the
bank. Figure 4.5 summarises the timing of a firm’s problem. The timing of the
firm’s problem closely follows Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
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V (x, z) V˜ (x˜, z′) V (x′, z′)
Resolution of
Uncertainty
(ω, θ, z′)
Debt Default
Decision
Equity Issuance
/ Firm Exit
Production
Decision
(k′, n′, b′, R′)
Figure 4.5: Timing of the model
In order to produce, firms must also pay a fixed cost of production c f > 0.
Firms that have positive net worth following the default decision are able to exit
and issue a final dividend. Each firm produces a homogeneous output according to
a decreasing returns to scale production function. The firm’s production technology
is given by
y = zω
(
k1−αnα
)v α ∈ (0,1) , v ∈ (0,1) (4.1)
Firm-specific productivity consists of a persistent component z and a transitory com-
ponent ω . There is no aggregate uncertainty in the model. The persistent produc-
tivity component z ∈ R+ follows an AR(1) process
lnz′ = ρz lnz+ ε ′z (4.2)
where ε ′z ∼ N (µε,z,σε,z). The transitory productivity component is realised at the
beginning of the period, after k, n and b have been chosen. It is assumed to be iid
across firms and across time, orthogonal to εz, and with values ω ∈Ω⊂ R+ drawn
from a distribution with cdf G(·).
The persistent component of productivity z′ is observed at the end of the current
period, before the firm decides if it will default on b and before the financing and
production decisions of the next period are chosen.
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At the beginning of each period, a firm is characterised by its net worth x
and the realisation of its persistent productivity level z. Firms are risk-neutral and
maximise the present discounted value of future dividends; firms discount dividends
using the discount factor (1+ r)−1 where 1+ r is the risk-free interest rate which is
assumed to remain constant over time.
The present discounted value of future dividends for a firm with persistent pro-
ductivity z and net worth x is denoted by V (x,z). I denote the implicit opportunity
cost of a firm with persistent productivity z′ exiting as x¯(z′)which is defined through
the following equation
V
(
x¯
(
z′
)
,z′
)
= 0 (4.3)
As firms with zero net worth are able to exit the economy without incurring the fixed
cost of production it follows that V (0,z′) ≥ 0 and the cost of exit will be weakly
negative x¯(z′)≤ 0 for all values of z′.
In addition to using internal funding, firms are able to issue equity e and obtain
debt financing b. Issuing equity is subject to an exogenously given cost function
which is increasing in the amount of equity issued. The issuance cost function is
given as
ψ (e) =

1
2ψ0e
2 e≥ 0
0 e < 0
(4.4)
The assumption of quadratic equity issuance is also made in Covas and Den Haan
(2012).
An implication of the equity issuance cost is that a firm issuing a negative
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quantity of equity is equivalent to a dividend issuance. I economise on notation by
allowing e to capture both equity issuance (e > 0) and dividend issuance (e < 0).
The firm must purchase both capital and labour before production occurs. The firm’s
budget constraint is
b′+ e+ x˜ = k′+
1
1+ r
(
wn′+ c f
)
(4.5)
The term x˜ is the firm’s end-of-period net worth after the realisation of revenues but
before the firm issues equity, w is the aggregate wage. The last term in the firm’s
budget constraint reflects the requirement that firms have sufficient funds available
to pay both workers and the fixed cost of production next period.
4.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
Firms borrow from competitive risk-neutral financial intermediaries. The oppor-
tunity cost for financial intermediaries of lending to firms is equal to the risk-free
interest rate (1+ r). Financial intermediaries maximise their expected profits from
lending. In equilibrium, free entry of financial intermediaries implies that they break
even in expectation. A firm that repays its debt has the following end-of-period net
worth
x˜R (ω,k,n,Rb;z) = zω
(
k1−αnα
)v
+(1−δ )k−Rb (4.6)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
If a firm defaults on its debt it must choose to enter either liquidation or in-
solvency. A firm that enters liquidation is forced to exit and forfeit any current
revenue and expected future earnings. The bank receives the firm’s resources after
production less a dead-weight loss equal to a fraction (1−θ) ∈ (0,1) of the firm’s
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resources after production. The total cost of liquidation is
(1−θ)
(
zω
(
k1−αnα
)v
+(1−δ )k
)
− x¯(z′) (4.7)
Liquidation in this model is similar to the default costs in the costly state verification
of Townsend (1979). Part of the firm’s end of period net worth comes from selling
its undepreciated capital at the end of the period; the liquidation cost includes a
fire-sale cost on this transaction. A liquidated firm makes the following payment to
financial intermediaries
TL (ω,k,n;z) = θ
(
zω
(
k1−αnα
)v
+(1−δ )k
)
(4.8)
A firm that restructures its debt does not exit and the firm bargains with the
bank over the resources after production less a dead-weight loss that results from
restructuring. This dead weight loss is
(1−θ)zE [ω](k1−αnα)v+(1−θ)(1−δ )k (4.9)
where θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0,1] is a firm specific recovery rate drawn from cdf H (θ) known
before the firm decides on whether to default on its debt. The recovery rate θ is
realised at the same time as ω and z′, before the firm’s default decision but after the
debt contracts have been finalised.
Two features of the restructuring cost are worth emphasising. First, the re-
structuring cost depends on the expected value of the revenue shock rather than the
4.2. Model 111
realisation of ω which adds a fixed cost element to the restructuring cost. As the liq-
uidation cost is decreasing in the realisation of ω this ensures that, everything else
equal, a lower realisation of ω makes it more likely that a firm chooses liquidation
over restructuring. Second, the cost of restructuring features the same fire-sale cost
on undepreciated capital as in the liquidation case, this is a simplifying assumption.
A firm that begins the restructuring process can be forced into liquidation by
either the firm or the bank and therefore both parties take their payoffs from firm
liquidation as their outside option and any remaining surplus is then bargained be-
tween the firm and the bank. A defaulting firm will restructure only if there is a
positive surplus obtained over firm liquidation. The surplus from restructuring over
liquidation is
SB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
= ((1−θ)ω− (1−θ)E [ω])z(k1−αnα)v− x¯(z′) (4.10)
The surplus from restructuring over liquidation is simply the cost of liquidation,
equation (4.7), less the cost of restructuring, equation (4.9). It follows that this sur-
plus will be positive in situations where restructuring is less costly than liquidation.
The firm’s bargaining weight is denoted by φ ∈ [0,1] and is a key parameter in
the modelling of insolvency regimes. Higher values of φ imply that the bargaining
power lies mostly with the firm and the insolvency regime is a more debtor-friendly
regime such as the US while low values of φ means the bargaining power lies with
the bank and the insolvency regime is a creditor-friendly regime such as the UK.
A firm that restructures will begin the next period with the following cash-in-
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hand
x˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
= φSB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
+ x¯
(
z′
)
(4.11)
A restructured firm makes the following payment to financial intermediaries
TB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
= (1−φ)SB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
+θ
(
zω
(
k1−αnα
)v
+(1−δ )k
)
(4.12)
where the first term is the share of the surplus from restructuring which goes to the
financial intermediary, while the second term is the payoff to the financial interme-
diary from liquidation which is also their outside option as they are able to refuse to
restructure a firm’s loan and instead force the firm into liquidation.
4.2.3 Households
There is a risk-neutral representative household that discounts the future at rate
β ∈ (0,1) and maximises the following utility function
∞
∑
t=0
β t
Ct + γ
N1+ 1ηt
1+ 1η
 , γ > 0, η > 0 (4.13)
where Ct is aggregate consumption, Nt is the aggregate labour supplied by the
household and the parameter η is the Frisch elasticity. Households own both firms
and financial intermediaries and buy risk-free bonds Bt from the financial interme-
diaries which are used to lend to firms. They maximise the discounted present value
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of utility subject to the following budget constraint
Ct +Bt+1+
∫
s jt+1 p jtd j = wtNt +(1+ rt)Bt +ΠBt +
∫
s jt
(
d jt + p jt
)
d j (4.14)
where p jt , d jt and s jt denote the price, dividends and fraction of shares in firm j
owned by the household and ΠBt denotes the profits of financial intermediaries.
As households are risk-neutral, the risk-free interest rate will be constant across
time and firms and households discount the future at the same rate. The first order
conditions for the household labour supply is given by
γN
1
η
t = wt (4.15)
This equation determines the aggregate labour supply in the economy.
4.3 Equilibrium
4.3.1 Debt Resolution
At the beginning of every period, a firm that borrowed in the previous period must
make a decision between repayment and default. If the firm defaults it must decide
between restructuring it debt or liquidating the firm. The default decision the firm
makes at the beginning of the next period will impact the interest rate the firm is
charged on debt in the current period.
Figure 4.6 is an illustration of the firm’s debt resolution decision in (θ ,ω)-
space for a hypothetical (z′,k,n,Rb,z). The space can be partitioned into three
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Figure 4.6: Firm’s debt resolution decision
areas.
When the realisation of the revenue shock ω is high and the value of restructur-
ing (θ ) isn’t too high, the firm will repay its loan. If the revenue shock ω is low and
the value of restructuring θ is also low, the firm will choose liquidation. Finally, if
ω isn’t too high but the value of restructuring θ is high, the firm will choose restruc-
turing over both liquidation and repaying its loan. The firm share of restructuring,
φ is also key to the firm’s debt resolution decision. Panel a) shows the case where φ
is low and hence the restructuring area is small while panel b) shows the case where
φ is high and hence the restructuring area is larger. Also note that firms will only
choose liquidation over restructuring if the surplus from restructuring is negative, as
a result, a change in φ doesn’t impact the boundary between the restructuring and
liquidation regions.
More formally, we can separate the space into three subsets. The first subset
SR (z′,k,n,Rb;z) is the region where the firm will repay its debt. The second subset
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SB (z′,k,n,Rb;z) is the region where the firm will default on its debt and restructure
its debt. The final subset SL (z′,k,n,Rb;z) is the region where the firm will default
on its debt and will liquidate the firm. Formally these regions are defined as follows
SR
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
=
{
(θ ,ω) ∈Θ×Ω : xR
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n,Rb;z
)≥ xB (θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z) ,
xR
(
ω,z′,k,n,Rb;z
)≥ x¯(z′)} (4.16)
SB
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
=
{
(θ ,ω) ∈Θ×Ω : xR
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
< xB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
,
xB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)≥ x¯(z′)} (4.17)
SL
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
=
{
(θ ,ω) ∈Θ×Ω : xR
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
< xB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
,
xB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
< x¯
(
z′
)}
(4.18)
The boundaries of these sets can be characterised by cutoffs of θ and ω¯ . First
consider the case where a firm is indifferent between repayment and liquidation,
then the following must hold
ω¯D
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
= max
{
Rb+ x¯(z′)− (1−δ )k
f (k,n)
,0
}
(4.19)
For ω less than this cutoff, the firm will always default on its outstanding debt.
Next, for ω < ω¯D (z′,k,n,Rb;z) the firm will be indifferent between restructuring
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and liquidation if the following equation holds
θ = [1− (1−θ)ω]− −x¯(z
′)
f (k,n)
(4.20)
This equation is decreasing in ω . Using this allows us to define cutoffs
θ¯B (z′,k,n;z) ≥ θ¯L (z′,k,n,Rb;z) such that a defaulting firm will always prefer re-
structuring if θ > θ¯B (z′,k,n;z) and a defaulting firm will always be liquidated
whenever θ < θ¯L (z′,k,n,Rb;z) where the cutoffs are defined by the following
equations
θ¯L
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
= max
{[
1− (1−θ) ω¯D
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)]− −x¯(z′)
f (k,n)
,0
}
(4.21)
θ¯B
(
z′,k,n;z
)
= max
{
1− −x¯(z
′)
f (k,n)
,0
}
(4.22)
For values of θ ∈ [θ¯L (z′,k,n,Rb;z) , θ¯B (z′,k,n;z)] whether a defaulting firm
will restructure or liquidate depends on the realisation of ω . Specifically, there
will be a cutoff ω¯L (z′,k,n;z) such that if ω ≥ ω¯L (z′,k,n;z) a defaulting firm will
restructure while if ω < ω¯L (z′,k,n;z) a defaulting firm will be liquidated. The
cutoff is defined by the following equation
ω¯L
(
z′,k,n;z
)
= max
{
x¯(z′)+(1−θ) f (k,n)
(1−θ) f (k,n) ,0
}
(4.23)
In cases where the firm has some bargaining power during restructuring
(φ > 0) the firm may choose to restructure when ω > ω¯D (z′,k,n,Rb;z). For this
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to occur, the recovery rate from restructuring must be sufficiently high, that is
θ > θ¯L (z′,k,n,Rb;z). The firm will prefer restructuring over repayment of its debt
wheneverω < ω¯B (θ ,z′,k,n;z)where the cutoff is defined by the following equation
ω¯B
(
θ ,z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
= max
{
ω¯D
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
)
+φ
((
θ − θ¯L (z′,k,n,Rb;z)
)
f (k,n)+ x¯(z′)
[1−φ (1−θ)] f (k,n)
)
,0
}
(4.24)
I refer to this case as strategic default as the firm has sufficient funds to be able
to repay its loan but chooses to restructure its debt as they receive a higher net-
worth by doing so. This is the only cutoff which depends on φ , specifically,
ω¯B (θ ,z′,k,n,Rb;z) is increasing in φ and thus for a given (z′,k,n,Rb,z) firms have a
greater incentive to restructure in a creditor-friendly (high φ ) regime than in debtor-
friendly (low φ ) regime.
4.3.2 Bank’s Problem
The expected profit of a bank for a given debt contract (k,n,Rb,b;z) is written as
ΠB (k,n,Rb,b;z) =Ez′|z
[
Rb
∫
SR(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
]
+Ez′|z
[∫
SB(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
TB
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
]
+Ez′|z
[∫
SL(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
TL (ω,k,n;z)d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
]
− (1+ r)b (4.25)
For a given contract (k,n,Rb,b;z) the profit of the bank is strictly decreasing
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in the firm’s bargaining power φ . There are two reasons for this. First as discussed
in the previous section, a firm with high bargaining power is more likely to default
on its debt and enter the restructuring process and the bank’s profit from restruc-
tured debt is strictly less than if the debt was repaid. Second, as the bank has less
bargaining power, it will receive a lower payment when the debt is restructured.
4.3.3 Firm’s problem
Following the realisation of its revenue and its default decision, a firm that is not
liquidated has cash-in-hand x˜ and knows the persistent component of its productiv-
ity for the next period z′. The firm can now choose to produce in the next period
or it can issue a final dividend and exit. The equity issuance problem is written as
follows
V˜
(
x˜,z′
)
= max
e
{
−(e+ψ (e))+ 1
1+ r
V
(
x˜+ e,z′
)
, x˜−ψ (−x˜)
}
(4.26)
The value function V˜ (·, ·) is not everywhere differentiable. Specifically, there will
be a point of non-differentiability at the point where the firm is indifferent between
default and repayment as well as at points of indifference between exit (without
default) and production. Nevertheless, by applying Theorem 1 from Clausen and
Strub (2016) it follows that at the optimal solution to the equity issuance problem
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the following first order condition is satisfied2
1
1+ r
∂V (x˜+ e,z′)
∂e
= 1+
∂ψ (e)
∂e
(4.27)
A firm with ∂V/∂e> 1+r will issue equity until they are no longer borrowing
constrained. A firm with ∂V/∂e = 1+ r is no longer borrowing constrained and
will be indifferent between issuing dividends and accumulating additional assets.
To ensure that firms do not accumulate too many bonds and the asset market clears,
I assume that in this situation shareholders demand that firms issue dividends rather
than accumulate assets. This ensures that there is a maximum net-worth for a firm
conditional on z.3
The firm’s problem can be written recursively as
V (x,z) = max
{k,n,b,R}
{
Ez′|z
[∫
SR(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
V˜
(
x˜R (ω,k,n,Rb;z) ,z′
)
d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
]
+Ez′|z
[∫
SB(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
V˜
(
x˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,k,n;z
)
,z′
)
d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
]}
(4.28)
subject to
V˜ (x˜,z) = max
{
max
e
{
−(e+ψ (e))+ 1
1+ r
V (x˜+ e,z)
}
, x˜−ψ (−x˜)
}
(4.29)
2To apply Theorem 1 from Clausen and Strub (2016) and obtain the first order condition pre-
sented in this section, it is necessary to construct a ’differentiable lower support function’, this is
made possible by the differentiability of the function ψ (e). If this function was not differentiable,
as in Gomes (2001) then this would not be possible and we would not be able to use Clausen and
Strub’s theorem here.
3A common assumption made here is that firms discount the future at a rate smaller than 1/1+ r.
I avoid making this assumption here so that there exist unconstrained firms in equilibrium. I will
exploit the existence of these firms in my calibration strategy.
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b+ x = k+
1
1+ r
(
wn+ c f
)
(4.30)
ΠB (k,n,Rb,b;z) = 0 (4.31)
The firm maximises expected utility by choosing a contract {k,n,b,R}. The
expectation in equation (4.28) is over future technology z′ and the transition of net
wealth x depends on the realisation ofω , z′ and the firm’s choice of whether it repays
or restructures its loan. Equation (4.29) combines the firm’s equity issuance and exit
decision, equation (4.30) specifies the firm’s budget constraint and equation (4.31)
specifies that due to perfect competition, banks makes zero profit in expectation.
4.3.4 Firm Entry
Every period there is a constant mass M > 0 of prospective firms. Each firm draws
an initial productivity level z0 from a distribution GE (·). Firms observe their initial
productivity level and then decide whether to enter the market or not. In order to
enter, a firm must pay a fixed entry cost ce > 0. Entrants fund the cost of entry
through an initial equity issuance and enter the economy with zero net-worth x = 0.
The value of a prospective entrant which receives an initial productivity level z0 is
VE (0,z) = max
e
{
−(e+ψ (e))+ 1
1+ r
V (e,z)
}
(4.32)
Firms will only enter if their initial productivity level is sufficiently high and
there is a cutoff value z¯ such that firms enter when z0 > z¯ with the cutoff defined by
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the following free-entry condition
VE (0, z¯) = ce (4.33)
Firms that enter the market decide on their production inputs and financing for the
following period. Entrants do not produce until the period following their entry.
4.3.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of (i) value functions V , V˜ , and VE , (ii)
policy functions n(x,z,Γ), k (x,z,Γ), b(x,z,Γ), R(x,z,Γ), e(x˜,z′,Γ) and z¯(Γ) (iii)
wage function w(Γ) and (iv) distribution of firms Γ such that
1. The value functions V (x,z), V˜ (x˜,z′) and policy functions n(x,z,Γ), k (x,z,Γ),
b(x,z,Γ), R(x,z,Γ), e(x˜,z′,Γ) solve the incumbent firm’s problem
2. The value function VE (0,z) and the policy functions solve the prospective
firm’s problem free entry condition hold for entrants and firms enter the mar-
ket only if z≥ z¯ where VE (0, z¯) = ce
3. Given the wage function w(Γ) and the interest, the labour, equity and bond
markets clear
4. The distribution of firms is consistent with firm decision rules and evolves
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according to the following law of motion
Γt+1
(
x′,z′
)
=
∫
SR
(1− χ˜R (ω,x;z))1{x′,z′|x,z}Γt (x,z)d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
+
∫
SB
(
1− χ˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,x;z
))
1{x′,z′|x,z}Γt (x,z)d [G(ω)×H (θ)]
+M
∫
z>z¯
1{x′,z′|x=0,z}dG(z) (4.34)
where 1{x′,z′|x,z} is the indicator function given the firm’s policy function.
χ˜R (ω,x;z) and χ˜B (ω,x;z) are the exit rules for firms following repayment
and restructuring of debt respectively. These equations are given by
χ˜R (ω,x;z) =1
{
V˜ (x˜R (ω,k (x,z) ,n(x,z) ,R(x,z)b(x,z) ;z) ,z)<
x˜R (ω,k (x,z) ,n(x,z) ,R(x,z)b(x,z) ;z)} (4.35)
χ˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,x;z
)
=1
{
V˜
(
x˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,k (x,z) ,n(x,z) ;z
)
,z
)
<
V˜
(
x˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,k (x,z) ,n(x,z) ;z
)
,z
)
<
x˜B
(
θ ,ω,z′,k (x,z) ,n(x,z) ;z
)}
(4.36)
The definition of a recursive equilibrium here allows me to analyse the dynamic
impact of shocks to the model. I will also consider the numerical solution to a sta-
tionary equilibrium which occurs at the point where Γt+1 (x′,z′) = Γt (x,z). For a
stationary distribution to exist, we require that firms have a sufficiently large proba-
bility of exiting. This will occur so long as there exists some combination of (ω,z)
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for all x at which point firms choose to exit.
4.3.6 Impact of the Insolvency Regime
Before turning to the calibration of the model, I first discuss some of the channels
through which the insolvency regime can impact the real economy and specifically,
labour productivity. The insolvency regime is determined by the firm’s bargaining
power in restructuring φ . In this section, I focus on the impact of φ on the capital-
to-labour ratio, which is a key component, along with aggregate TFP, of labour
productivity. The mechanism through which the capital-to-labour ratio is made
clear in the following equation for the capital-to-labour ratio which I obtained from
the first-order conditions of the firm’s problem
k
n
=
(
1−α
α
)(
w
r+δ +(1−δ )Λk (k,n,Rb;z)
)
(4.37)
where Λk (k,n,Rb;z) is a distortion to the capital-to-labour ratio given by the fol-
lowing equation
Λk (k,n,Rb;z) = (1−θ)Ez′|z
[∫ 1
θ¯L(z′,k,n,Rb;z)
G
(
ω¯B
(
θ ,z′,k,n,Rb;z
))
dHθ
]
+(1−θ)Ez′|z
[
H
(
θ¯L
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
))
G
(
ω¯D
(
z′,k,n,Rb;z
))]
(4.38)
which is simply the expected default probability multiplied by (1−θ). Thus equa-
tion (4.37) provides a direct mechanism through which an increase in the default
probability leads to a decrease in the capital-to-labour ratio and hence a fall in labour
productivity.
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Figure 4.7: Impact of φ on firm leverage
As illustrated by Figure 4.6, an increase in φ will mean the firm has a greater
incentive to restructure loans that it could otherwise repay. However, banks will
anticipate the lower repayment probability and will adjust loan terms accordingly,
which would result in higher interest rates being charged to the firm. As is com-
mon to models based on the costly state verification model of debt, the interest rate
schedule offered to the firms is backward-bending and there is an upper limit to firm
leverage where L = bx+b is firm leverage. An illustration of this is set out in Figure
4.7 where a higher φ results in higher interest rate and a lower debt capacity.
Furthermore, firms that are more highly leveraged will require higher output in
order to repay the loan and hence the default probability is increasing in leverage.
This allows Figure 4.8 to be rewritten in terms of Λk and L as illustrated by Figure
4.8. In cases where the bank response to high φ is sufficiently strong, a higher φ
4.4. Calibration 125
k
Figure 4.8: Impact of regime on default probability
results in lower debt capacity and lower maximum default probability.
4.4 Calibration
I solve the model numerically using a baseline calibration of the model to UK data
since the financial crisis. One period in the model is a year. The distribution of
entrants is assumed to be the stationary distribution implied by the AR(1) process
for z. I approximate the process for z using the method described in Tauchen (1986).
The distribution for θ ∈ [0,1] is assumed to be a standard uniform distribution.
The distribution of the revenue shocks ω are log-normal with µω = −12σ2ω so that
E [ω] = 1.
The model parameters are split into two categories, those calibrated using the
model through indirect inference and those that are calibrated outside of the model
or taken from standard values found in the literature. The first set of parameters
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are set out in Table 4.1 and are not inferred using the model. The second set of
parameters are jointly calibrated using moments from the model. Table 4.2 sets out
the benchmark values and provides a summary of the moments targeted.
Parameter Value Source
Interest rate r 0.04 annual interest rate
Depreciation rate δ 0.1 standard parameter
Discount factor β 1/1.04 inverse of 1+ r
Labour production elasticity α 0.65 standard parameter
Decreasing returns parameter v 0.85 standard parameter
Mass of potential entrants M 0.405 set so that N = 0.72
Labour utility parameter γ 1.55 set so that w = 1
Frisch elasticity η 0.75 Chetty et al. (2011)
Persistence of z productivity ρz 0.597 estimated from UK firm data
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
The risk-free interest rate r is set to 4% which is a commonly used value in
annual models. The discount factor β is set to be the inverse of 1+ r so that firms
discount the future at the same rate as firms. The depreciation rate of capital δ is set
to 0.1. The Frisch elasticity η is set to 0.75 which is a value suggested by Chetty
et al. (2011) for representative agent macro models. The utility function parameter
γ is chosen so that the household’s labour supply equation is consistent with the
wage w which is normalised to 1. This, coupled with the mass of potential entrants
M pins down the employment level in the model and M is calibrated to ensure that
steady state employment equals 0.72 which is approximately the employment rate
of the UK.
The parameters of the production function are similar to those used in the lit-
erature, with the labour production elasticity α set to 0.65 which is approximately
the labour share of income in the UK and the decreasing returns to scale parameter
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Parameter Value Target
Firm Bargaining Power φ 0.149 Ratio of administrations to liquidations
Fixed cost of production c f 0.279 Entry rate of UK firms
Cost of entry ce 0.866 One year survival rate of UK firms
s.d of technology process σz 0.183 Debt-to-asset ratio
s.d. of revenue shocks σω 0.487 Liquidation rate of UK firms
Liquidation recovery rate θ 0.210 Default recovery rate
Equity issuance cost ψ 1.48 Equity-to-asset ratio
Table 4.2: Model-estimated parameters
v set to 0.85 which is used in other similar models such as in Corbae and D’Erasmo
(2017).
The parameters for the persistence of the firm technology shock ρz is estimated
independently from the other parameters using Compustat data for UK firms. To
estimate the parameters we follow a method similar to that described in Blundell
and Bond (2000) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), in particular, I estimate the
following equation
lnyit = ρz lnyit−1+a1 lnnit +a2 lnnit−1+a3 lnkit +a4 lnkit−1+At + η˜it (4.39)
where yit is the firm’s revenue, kit is capital, nit is employment and the parameters
are estimated using a dynamic panel data model.
The regression estimated in equation (4.39) could be used to estimate the vari-
ance of productivity shocks, however, in the model, this would correspond to a
combination of σz and σω . Instead, I calibrate the standard deviation of the tech-
nology parameter σz to the average debt-to-asset ratio of the Compustat firms. The
standard deviation of the revenue shock σω is calibrated to the proportion of firms
in the UK declaring bankruptcy. Data from the UK Insolvency Service suggests
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Targeted Moments (%) Model Data
Firm entry rate 10.7 12.3
Debt-to-asset ratio 55.4 47.9
Equity-to-asset ratio 19.2 18.0
Proportion of defaulting firms 0.651 0.660
Ratio of restructures to liquidations 10.6 10.8
Debt recovery-rate in default 22.4 20.2
One year survival rate 90.4 90.5
Untargeted Moment (%) Model Data
Average spread on borrowing 3.13 2.05
Table 4.3: Calibrated Moments
that 0.66% of the total number of firms in the UK declare bankruptcy every year.
The fixed cost of production c f is calibrated to the average startup rate of UK firms
between 2008 and 2015, while the cost of entry (ce) is calibrated to the one year
survival rate of UK firms. The data for both of these targets is obtained from the
Eurostat Structural business statistics database.
Armour et al. (2012) study the impact of a 2003 change in UK Bankruptcy law.
They find that post-2003, in the UK the debtor recovers through Administrations
20.2% of their claim on average. I choose the liquidation recovery rate θ to match
this recovery rate. In the UK insolvency regime, firms that default and attempt to
restructure enter administration rather than another form of insolvency. I use data
from the UK Insolvency Service on the average proportion of total insolvencies that
are administrations between 2008 and 2017 to calibrate the firm’s bargaining power
φ which in the model governs the likelihood that a firm restructures rather than
enters bankruptcy. The equity cost parameter ψ is chosen to match the equity-to-
asset ratio of the UK firms sampled in Compustat.
Table 4.3 sets out the moments used to calibrate the model and the model fit.
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The model fits the data reasonably well although it struggles somewhat to capture
the entry rate of firms and the debt-to-asset ratio. The model also does a reasonable
job at fitting the average spread on borrowing, which was an untargeted moment.
The data for the UK spread on borrowing comes from the Bank of England.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Steady State
In this section I explore the steady state properties of the benchmark model and com-
pare it to the steady state of a model that features a more debtor-friendly insolvency
regime. The debtor-friendly regime uses the same parameters as the benchmark
model, with the exception of the firm’s bargaining power during debt restructure
(φ ) which is increased. The increase in φ is calibrated to the ratio of firm restruc-
turings to liquidations in the US economy. The data comes from the American
Bankruptcy Institute and is calculated as the ratio of Chapter 11 bankruptcies to the
total number of Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcies. This ratio is 17.6% which
is larger than the target of the benchmark model of 10.8% which was calibrated
to UK data. The resulting parameter increase in the debtor-friendly is set to 0.273
which results in a ratio of restructurings to liquidations of 17.9% which is close to
the targeted moment. As the mass of entrants is fixed at the same quantity for the
two models, the wage adjusts to ensure the labour market clears.
I refer to the benchmark model as the creditor-friendly model with φL = 0.149
and compare it to the debtor-friendly model which features φH = 0.273. Table 4.4
compares the aggregate values of the steady states for the two regimes. While the
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Creditor-friendly (φL) Debtor-friendly (φH)
Bargaining Power (φ ) 0.148 0.273
Wage (w) 1.0 0.995
Employment (N) 0.720 0.717
Aggregate Capital (K) 2.65 2.65
Output (Y ) 3.84 3.83
Y/N 5.34 5.36
K/N 3.62 3.68
Table 4.4: Steady State Aggregates of Insolvency Regimes
Moments (%) Creditor-friendly (φL) Debtor-friendly (φH)
Firm entry rate 10.7 10.5
Debt-to-asset ratio 55.4 54.3
Equity-to-asset ratio 19.2 18.7
Proportion of defaulting firms 0.651 0.535
Ratio of restructures to liquidations 10.6 17.9
Debt recovery-rate in default 22.4 24.3
One year survival rate 90.4 90.5
Average spread on borrowing 3.13 3.09
Table 4.5: Moments of Insolvency Regimes
change in the aggregate values is minimal, the φH economy has lower output, lower
aggregate capital and a lower equilibrium wage. This is because the increase in
firm bargaining power leads to firms getting charged higher interest rates. This
is shown in table 4.5 which compares the moments of the two models. The φH
economy features a slightly higher spread on firm borrowing despite a lower default
probability. This is due to the impact of the firm’s bargaining power on the average
recovery rate of loans in default.
The fall in the equilibrium wage means that for this calibration, the φH econ-
omy features a slightly lower capital-to-labour ratio and thus lower labour produc-
tivity as measured by the output to employment ratio as found in table 4.4 Both
regimes feature lower than optimal capital investment. This is due to the financial
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frictions distorting the relative price of capital and labour.
0 10 20 30 40 50
Firm Net Worth
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
De
ns
ity
Distribution of Firm Net Worth
L
H
Figure 4.9: Distribution of Firm Net Worth (x) in the Steady State
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of Persistent Firm Productivity (z) in the Steady State
As discussed earlier, equation (4.38) specifies a distortion on the capital-to-
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Figure 4.11: Distribution of Persistent Firm Productivity (z) of Entrants
labour ratio which increases with the firm’s probability of default. This is due to the
fire-sale cost of selling depreciated capital if the firm defaults which makes holding
capital less efficient for firms with a higher default probability. The φH economy
features a lower default probability which lowers the value of Λk and this is the key
driver of the increase in the capital-to-labour ratio from the φL economy to the φH
economy..
The unconditional distributions of firm net worth and persistent productivity
z are shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 respectively. The φH economy features
more selection into the economy and thus the distribution of firm net worth x and
productivity z shift to the right.
The increase in firm bargaining power, if everything else were constant would
result in the bank charging higher interest spreads. However, in the φH economy,
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firms are unable to borrow as much and are less highly leveraged, hence why the
spread on borrowing actually decreases. Both of these factors make production
more costly in the φH economy and thus less productive firms exit sooner and there
is more selection in firm entry. Figure 4.11 shows the productivity distribution
of entrants in the steady state. As the mass of potential firms M is held constant
between the two economies, the greater selection in the φH economy results in fewer
entrants, a smaller mass of firms in the stationary distribution and a higher survival
rate of newly entering firms. The fall in the equilibrium wage again dampens the
variation of the distributions across regimes.
4.5.2 Dynamic Response
In this section I present the dynamic response of the model to an unexpected aggre-
gate shock to the distribution of firms. The shock is a negative shock to the mean of
the revenue shock distribution such that E [ω] falls by 0.1 standard deviations. The
shock lasts for only one period and following its impact, reduces the revenue and
hence the net wealth of firms in the economy. Firms with sufficiently low net wealth
will exit the economy, reducing the mass of incumbent firms below the steady state
value. As the mass of entrants is constrained by the value of M, the wage will adjust
to ensure the labour market clears. I assume that firms fully anticipate the path of
wages, which after the initial probability zero shock follow a deterministic path. As
the wage changes, the firm’s policy functions also change. From a technical point
of view, this requires the firm’s problem to be solved in order to find the wage that
clears the market.
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Figure 4.12: Dynamic Response to a negative shock to Firm productivity z
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Figure 4.12 sets out the response of the two regimes to the negative shock to
z. Employment falls less in the creditor-friendly (φL) than the debtor-friendly (φH)
regime, employment falling 3 percent on impact in the φL case compared to 5.4
percent with φH . Labour productivity, measured as the ratio of output to employ-
ment, falls in both models, but falls most in the creditor-friendly regime (φL). In
this experiment, the φH economy features leads to a 75 percent larger peak drop
in employment and a 20 percent smaller fall in labour productivity following the
negative productivity shock.
Labour productivity falls as firms are more borrowing constrained when their
bargaining power is low and this in turn leads to firms lowering their capital hold-
ings, with the capital-to-labour ratio falling more in the creditor-friendly regime.
The response of output to the shock is similar in both regimes, suggesting that
the employment and productivity responses roughly offset. The firm’s bargaining
power during restructuring may be costly in the steady-state, but provides a degree
of insurance when the firm, or the economy, is hit by a negative shock. Firms that
default as a result of the shock are more likely to restructure their debt when their
bargaining power is high and firms that restructure their debt will begin the next
period with higher net worth and thus are less borrowing constrained than if their
bargaining power was low.
While the wage falls further in the debtor-friendly insolvency regime, this oc-
curs for the same reasons as the fall in employment as w and N move together as can
be shown from equation (4.15). As firms hit by the negative productivity shock more
firms exit and employment falls. As employment falls, the household labour sup-
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ply condition results in a falling wage. In the creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime,
borrowing constrained firms substitute from capital to labour and the resulting fall
in employment is less, hence the equilibrium wage falls less. The debtor-friendly
regime does not fully capture the US experience, labour productivity still falls in
the model while it rose slightly following the crisis. Fully capturing the response
of the US economy was not the purpose of this exercise and I chose to calibrate
the model to UK data only. However, the current formulation of the model would
struggle to reverse the direction of the labour productivity response. This is because
the capital-to-labour ratio will fall as the firm’s default risk increases and a nega-
tive shock will increase the firm’s probability of default. Nevertheless, the model
presented here highlights how the difference in insolvency regimes between the UK
and the US can partly explain the fall in labour productivity the UK witnessed since
the financial crisis.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a heterogeneous firm model of the UK’s creditor-friendly insol-
vency regime and investigates a hypothetical change in the insolvency regime to a
US-style debtor-friendly regime. The insolvency regime is modeled as a costly-state
verification model where firms have the option to restructure their debt. Default
costs create a wedge on the capital-to-labour wedge, effectively raising the price of
holding capital for high-risk firms. As a consequence of this, firms that are more
borrowing constrained have a lower capital-to-labour ratio and thus lower labour
productivity. In the steady-state, less firm bargaining power results in lower firm
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borrowing rates and higher output. The dynamic response of the benchmark model
to a negative shock matches the response of the UK to the financial crisis. In par-
ticular, following a negative shock to firm productivity firms in the creditor-friendly
regime substitute from capital to labour. This dampens the fall in employment while
causing labour productivity to fall. Firms in a debtor-friendly insolvency regime,
while more costly in the steady-state allows firms to remain less borrowing con-
strained following a large aggregate shock and thus these firms hold relatively more
capital relative to their counterparts in a creditor-friendly regime. In addition to the
static benefits of the UK regime the results highlight the trade off in the dynamic re-
sponse to shocks. The counterfactual debtor-friendly insolvency regime led to a 75
percent larger peak drop in employment following the negative productivity shock
but a 20 percent smaller fall in labour productivity.
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